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EXPLANATORY STATEMENT 
I. THE FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE IN TRANSATLANTIC ECONOMIC RELATIONS 
INTRODUCTION 
1. The European Community and the United States of America represent the two 
pillars of the Western political and economic system. They are intimately 
linked by a common political and cultural background and share a large number 
of common interests and ideals. Both have done a great deal to develop the 
concept of a democratic society and are now faced with the task of presenting 
a common approach to the challenges facing democracy from the worldwide 
economic crisis, social problems and threats to security. 
The Community as a whole is the United States' most important trading partner 
and political ally. It is the second largest industrial power in the world 
after the United States and its aggregate GNP is in fact even Larger than that 
of the USA. 
2. After the Second World War the United States played an active part in the 
economic recovery of Europe firstly with the Marshall aid plan, then 
partnership in the OECD (formerly OEEC) and finally it encouraged progress 
towards European unification and the expansion of the Community. There has 
therefore been concern in Europe at the fact that in recent years certain 
tensions have developed in trade relations between the Community and the USA 
which in the course of 1982 reached crisis proportions. Although the 
settlement of the dispute on the construction of the European-Soviet natural 
gas pipeline and the autumn 1982 steel agreement <see below) have Led to a 
temporary relaxing of tension in transatlantic relations, the escalating 
conflict in the field of agricultural policy, the re-emergence of differences 
of opinion on steel and the problem of the extra-territorial nature of export 
controls still present serious problems. 
3. Greater cooperation and coordination of all types of economic and 
political Links between the United States and Europe on the principle of an 
'equal partnership' are essential if any progress is to be made toward solving 
mutual and international economic, trade and monetary problems. This in turn 
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requires the intensive use of all channels of exchange and communication that 
exist in a variety of bilateral and multilateral forms between the Community 
and the USA, e.g. within the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT>, 
the OECD or the annual Western economic summits. At the next world economic 
summit in London this year it will be necessary to formulate a coordinated 
policy on current deep-seated trade and monetary problems. High-Level talks 
take place twice a year in Brussels or Washington between the Commission and 
representatives of the American Government on bilateral and multilateral 
problems relating to trade and economy. The United States has representation 
at the European Community and the Commission has a permanent delegation in 
Washington. 
4. Regular meetings have been taking place for over 10 years between 
delegations from the European Parliament and the US Congress. These meetings 
have now become an institution. This enables European interests to be made 
known to American congressmen, whose views are strongly influenced by internal 
US considerations and who tend to see European and global problems from the 
standpoint of superpower interests. 
5. Relations between the United States and the Community are also covered by 
a series of bilateral agreements. The 1977 Fisheries Agreement, which is 
provisionally in force until 1 July 1984, regulates catch quotas within the 
200-mile limits off the USA by Community fishing vessels. The 1982 Steel 
Agreement seeks to Limit and safeguard European carbon steel exports to the 
United States until December 1985. There is also an agreement on supplying 
the Community with nuclear fuel (1958> and cooperation on the peaceful use of 
nuclear energy <1959). This latter agreement was amended four times in the 
period 1960-1972 to take account of technological developments and also forms 
the basis for the export of nuclear materials purchased in the USA and 
processed in Europe. 
The economic situation in the United States and in the Community1 
6. Since the most recent recession in 1 81 and 1 82 there has been an extra-
ordinary reversal of trends in the US economy. Average economic growth for 
1983 was 3.57., the rate of .inflation settled down at 3.27. and unemployment 
1 For footnotes see 1 References 1 pp. 42 and 43 
WG/2/0407E 
- 2 - PE 84.569/fin.B 
OR.DE. 
• 
' 
• 
• 
fell by 2.5 points from its peak in December 1982 to 8.2%. Nine million 
Americans are still out of work, but about 4 million new jobs had been created 
within a year. By the end of 1983 industry was working at nearly 80% of 
capacity, and, despite high interest rates, the US Conference Board forecasts 
that investment will increase by 7% and industrial production by 9.8%. It 
also predicts a possible 5.4% rise in GNP. This constructive picture is 
however marred by high budget deficits and interest rates which, according to 
the Latest OECD annual economic report on the USA, could jeopardize Lasting 
and stable expansion. The budget deficit <$185,000 million in 1983) will 
probably break through the $200,000 million barrier in the 1984 budget, so 
that a fall in interest rates is unlikely. In the past, large budget deficits 
and high interest rates have meant that the dollar has been overvalued, which 
has had a disastrous effect on the US balance of trade. In 1983 the foreign 
trade deficit was about $70,000 million, and the 1984 figure is estimated at 
about $100,000 million. 
7. The reduced export opportunities and rising demand for foreign products on 
the US domestic market accompanying the high dollar exchange rate have 
severely curtailed the competitive ability of US industry and agriculture. To 
this must be added the structural problems of a number of traditional trouble 
spots in th~ US economy (e.g. steel, textiles) which are already highly 
vulnerable to foreign competition. Against this background there has been an 
increasing tendency in the US to blame the economic behaviour of her trading 
partners for some of her difficulties, and to wring concessions out of them. 
However, without adequate stimuli for expansion, the economic difficulties 
facing Europe are far greater than those facing the USA. Thus unemployment in 
the Community is expected to rise still further to 13 million in 1984 alone • 
As foreign trade is far more important for the Community than for the USA, 
difficult negotiations are likely on the question of whether for example 
American industry is 'harmed' by European imports or whether the Community has 
achieved more than its 'fair' share of the world market by means of subsidized 
exports. 
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The world economy 
8. After the Second World War, the USA enjoyed a virtually unrestricted 
leading position in the world economy for many years. This position however 
changed as the world economy developed. Under the aegis of the United States' 
political and economic Leadership there was an enormous growth in the world 
economy and international trade. As part of the Liberalization brought about 
by the GATT rounds, world grew disproportionately rapidly in relation to world 
production and there was considerable growth in international links, 
particularly between the industrialized nations. This led to greater 
international competition and temporary production advances began to play an 
ever more important role. 
9. But not only trade relations changed, the parties themselves changed with 
new elements becoming involved. The creation of Larger economic areas such as 
the European Community, the penetration of· Japan into world markets and the 
rise of the newly-industrialized countries led to a shift of balance in the 
international economic system and redirection of the flow of trade. 
10. The US economic response to the shift in circumstances and in particular 
the challenge from Europe was to take the dollar off the gold standard and 
temporarily introduce a 107. import tax in 1971 with the following effects: it 
stimulated European efforts towards diversification of trade relations <the 
search for new markets and sources of supply) and led to the association 
policy of Yaounde and Lome with preference agreements for developing countries 
(ACP States>. As a result of the policy of detente, economic relations 
between the Community countries and COMECON also surged ahead, so that by the 
end of the '70s Community exports to COMECON were roughly two thirds as high 
as Community exports to the USA. 
The American approach to trade policy 
11. These developments led to a shift in the United States' trade policy 
vis-a-vis its main trading partners and in particular the Community. When the 
US balance of trade and balance of payments moved into the red towards the end 
of the '60s and beginning of the '70s, the United States' role as the leading 
protagonist of a free world economic order and free world trade became 
burdensome 2• The standard American expression 'free trade' was 
increasingly replaced by 'fair trade'. The USA sought concessions from its 
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trading partners, particularly the Community. This is surprising inasmuch as 
the United States, as we have stated above, not only accepted the process of 
European unification, and in particular economic integration, but actively 
encouraged this on the political grounds that only an economically strong and 
integrated Western Europe could prevent the spread of Communism in Europe. 
The possibility that the Europeans could become competitive played a minor 
role and was viewed as the price which one was prepared to pay to strengthen 
Western Europe politically, economically and militarily in the interests of 
American security. By the beginning of the 70's however, Western Europe had 
become integrated economically and the ideological and military threat from 
Communism was seen as minimal. This Western European integration now appeared 
to have been at the expense of the USA. The hitherto neglected view of Europe 
as a competitor now came to the fore and the American strategy towards the 
European Community changed. Although the process of European unification was 
still welcomed, it was said that the Europeans should demonstrate greater 
willingness to share with the United States the burden of a stable world 
order. The Community should limit the disadvantages to the USA of its policy 
of enlargement and association and relax its regional measures to allow 
greater access to the market for American goods. This was one of the main US 
objectives in the Tokyo Round of the GATT negotiations <see paragraph 67). 
12. Although the Community made concessions to ~he United States on tariffs 
during the Tokyo Round, there appears to be a growing view in the USA that 
American interests suffered during both the Tokyo and Kennedy Rounds of GATT. 
The penetration of Europe and Japan on world markets has tended to strengthen 
rather than weaken this view. Moreover, the American balance of trade has 
been in deficit for years, the deficit has grown and exports from newly 
industrialized countries and Japan have been exerting noticeable pressure on 
domestic American markets for some time. 
13. US administrations traditionally favour a free trade position and seek to 
moderate demands from economic interest groups for greater protection. 
Protectionist pressures have however become harder to resist. The loss of 
competitiveness in entire industries in national and international markets 
consequent on the high dollar exchange rate has led to a rash of bills in 
Congress such as the Trade Remedy, Fair Trade Steel, Wine Equity, Reciprocity, 
Local Content and Buy American Bills, the purpose of which is to prevent or 
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Limit imports or to establish reciprocity in trade. Until now the US 
administration has rejected a narrow view of reciprocity as a future principle 
of American trade policy, but even here there appears to be growing support 
for a policy of mutual and equal access to the market at least in some 
sectors. Should this trend continue in the United States it would, however, 
end up by removing the basis for the multilateral trading system. 
14. The imposition of import restrictions and the acceptance of requests for 
protection in various sectors such as steel, footwear, textiles, wine, machine 
tools and copper have given rise to justified fears that the Reagan 
administration will not be capable of adequately resisting protectionist 
pressures during an election year. As these measures have already affected 
US $4,700 million-worth of EEC exports to the USA, the Council felt obliged to 
issue an official statement expressing its concern at the situation, which was 
jeopardizing bilateral trade, in February this year. 
15. Other problems have emerged recently. More and more individual States 
(more than a dozen at the moment> are introducing unitary taxation under which 
they are able, by virtue of their autonomy, to assess foreign subsidiaries for 
tax on the basis of part of the parent concern's international income. The 
Commission has made representations to the American authorities against this 
practice since 1980. Investigations by the US Treasury into the effects of 
unitary taxation seem to have cleared a path for a domestic compromise between 
the States and the Federal authorities taking European interests into 
account. There is however a number of other problems on which the US 
Administration's attitude is not clear, for instance the recent idea of a 15% 
tax to be imposed, as in 1971, on all imported goods. The United States• 
rapidly increasing trade deficit is obviously causing the Administration and 
the Congress to consider countermeasures, including drastic action. 
II. TRADE RELATIONS 
16. The United States is the Community's most important trading partner, 
accounting in 1982 for some 15.6X of the Community's total foreign trade (see 
table A on trade between the Community and the USA>. In the Latter half of 
the 70s, the Community was the main customer for American exports followed by 
Canada, Latin America and Japan and the second largest importer to the USA 
after Canada (see table B). Throughout the '70s trade between Europe and the 
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US flourished. The volume of trade between the United States and the 
Community grew by almost four and a half times between 1970 and 1980 <although 
US world trade grew by more than five and a half times ~ see table C). The 
Community's balance of trade with the United States is, however, permanently 
and chronically in deficit and in 1980 reached the record level of $24,600 m 
(US $17,700 m according to the US trade representative>. 
However, the Community deficit has steadily fallen since 1981, and the US 
surplus dropped from $13,900 million in 1981 to $10,700 million in 1982, 
principally because of the decline in US exports owing to the strength of the 
dollar. According to American estimates there might even be a return to a US 
trade deficit with the Community for 1983 as a whole, for the first time in 11 
years. 
17. Structure of bilateral trade: In the '70s the United States exported 
more primary products to the Community than it imported from it while the 
Community exported more semi-finished and finished goods to the USA than it 
imported from it. The United States' surplus from trade in primary goods was, 
however, far higher than that achieved by the Community from bilateral trade 
in semi-finished and finished goods. Moreover, in 1976 and 1981 the USA 
achieved a slight surplus in this area too; and in 1980 the surplus was 
considerable, namely US $3,280 m <see table D). The Community's balance of 
trade deficits vis-a-vis the USA are mainly due to the Large quantity of 
American agricultural exports (within the primary goods sector). The 
Community is one of the most important markets for American agricultural 
products and US exports in this category regularly ~xceeded American imports 
from the Community in the '70s by four to five times despite the constant 
claims of agricultural protectionism on the part of the Community (see 
table E). 
In bilateral trade in industrial products, the American position during the 
'70s was virtually always in deficit in relation to steel production, road 
vehicles (goods vehicles and passenger vehicles), textiles and clothing. The 
USA achieved regular surpluses from trade in chemical products, computers and 
aircraft, which particularly as regards the Latter two areas indicates a 
certain dependence on the part of the Community on the transfer of 
sophisticated technology from the USA <see table F). 
18. Foreign trade dependence: Foreign trade dependence can be illustrated, 
for example, by comparing trade to gross national product (GNP>. This 
illustrates the extent to which an economic area is dependent on the 
WG/2/0407E 
- 7 - PE 84.569/fin.B 
international trade system or is in a position of relative autonomy. Both 
economic areas, the Community and the United States, have increased their 
dependence on exports and imports from the world market. The rate of growth 
has, however, been higher for the USA than for the Community. Between 1970 
and 1980, the United States' dependence on world trade doubled: the US export 
rate (total exports/GNP) rose from 4.3% in 1970 to 8.2% in 1980; the import 
rate rose over this period from 4.3 to 9.2X. Although the United States' 
foreign trade dependence has increased overall at a faster rate than that of 
the Community so that the relative autonomy of the United States has declined 
with growing international involvement, the Community is still far more 
involved in, and thus dependent on, foreign trade than the United States: the 
Community's export rate in 1979, for example, was 11.2X, compared with only 
7.5% for the United States. In the same year the Community's import rate was 
12.7%, whereas for the USA it was 9.1% 3• 
19. Interdependence: The importance of bilateral trade and interdependence 
which results can be seen by comparing, for example, the volume of trade of 
the United States with the Community in relation to their respective GNP. 
1960 1970 1975 1979 1980 
US-EC trade/GNP (USA) 1.8 2.1 2.6 3.1 3.4 
US-EC trade/GNP (EC) 3.4 3.3 2.9 3.2 
Source: see table G 
Whereas in 1960 the dependence of the Community on the United States was far 
greater than vice versa (virtually twice as high) this relationship became 
balanced by the end of the '70s. The figures above show an increasing trend 
for the United States and a slight decline for the Community. While the 
importance of bilateral trade has increased for the United States over the 
Last 20 years, it has declined for the Community. Overall the relative 
importance of bilateral trade has become more balanced. The relationship is 
more symmetrical now than 20 years ago and has shifted to the advantage of the 
C • 4 ommumty. 
20. If we turn from considerations of GNP and compare bilateral trade to 
overall foreign trade we obtain the following picture: in 1982 the Community 
obtained 17.4X of its total imports from the United States and exports from 
Europe accounted for 17% of total US imports. In the same year the Community 
exported 13.8% of its total exports to the United States and the Community 
accounted for 23% of total US exports 5 Whereas, therefore, the 
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proportions are roughly equivalent in the case of bilateral imports, i.e. 
bilateral imports have roughly the same importance for overall foreign trade 
for the Community as for the United States, the Community is far more 
important as a sales market for the USA: American exports to the Community as 
a proportion of total US exports are more than one and a half times as high as 
the corresponding proportion of Community exports. 
21. Summary: The lack of balance in reciprocal trade dependence has evened 
out to the benefit of the Community. Both parties are roughly equally 
dependent on each other now (with a rising trend in the case of the USA). 
This would imply that the United States has Lost influence and importance in 
trade with the Community. Despite the increase in its ratio to GNP in the 
case of the USA, transatlantic trade is nowadays not as important for either 
region as it was in the '60s and early '70s. Other regions have become more 
important both for the USA and for the Community. The potential for trade 
conflicts has therefore grown. Seen as part of total foreign trade, however, 
bilateral exports are more important for the US than for the Community, 
whereas differences in the import sector are relatively small. The conclusion 
from this account of transatlantic trade relations is that the cost to the 
Community of conflicts resulting in restrictions, reductions or even 
disruptions of trade relations would be far Less nowadays than 10 or 20 years 
ago. Disruptions of trade would, however, still represent a serious blow to 
the Community as its dependence on foreign trade as a whole is far higher than 
that of the United States. Conversely the interests of the United States 
would hardly be served by protracted trade conflicts given the importance of 
the Community as an export market for American goods. This mutual inter-
dependence therefore makes it necessary for both parties to cooperate to find 
solutions to any conflicts which may arise in bilateral or international trade. 
Ill. CAPITAL RELATIONS 
22. An analysis of the flow of goods between the Community and the United 
States only provides a limited picture of economic interdependence. The 
picture becomes clearer if one considers capital relations in the business 
sector, i.e., direct investment, which may be regarded as a substitute for 
free trade. For example. the total value of sales by the subsidiary companies 
of US manufacturers Located in the Community amounted in 1976 to 
US$ 171,500 m. This was six-and-a-half times as high as the value of American 
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exports to the Community in that year (US exports to the Community in 1976 = 
US$ 25,400 m ) and eight-and-a-half to nine times as high as the value of 
non-agricultural US exports. 6 
23. Concentration of US direct investment in the Community: 
Direct investment by the United States and the Community constitutes the bulk 
of all foreign direct investment throughout the world. Capital exporters from 
both economic areas each represent the Leading foreign direct investors in 
each other's respective region, i.e., the Americans' account for the Largest 
proportion of foreign direct investment in the Community and the Europeans 
occupy the same position among foreign investors in the USA. A striking 
aspect of the trend in American direct investment abroad is its increasing 
concentration in the Community. Since its foundation the Community has been 
one of the parts of the world in which American direct investments have grown 
most rapidly. Whereas in 1958 Europe accounted for only 7 % of total American 
direct investment abroad, this had grown by 1978 to 32.8% and in 1980 
totalled 35.9% (see table H). The explanation for this development may be 
seen both in the prosperous and Large market which offers an incentive to 
build or acquire manufacturing capacity directly in Europe and in the entry 
into the Community of Britain which was one of the countries favoured for 
American foreign investment. 
24. Bilateral capital relations: In the sixties the fear emerged in Europe 
of a sell-out of European industry to extensive direct American control 
because American corporations have considerable influence on European 
production and own Large proportions of certain sectors. This fear 
diminished however in the 70's. The commitment of European capital in the USA 
increased not least because of the more realistic value of the dollar. In 
1975 a total Western European direct investment of US$ 16,500 m was more than 
two-and-a-half times as high as the 1965 figure of US$ 6,100 m <1960 
US$ 4,600 m>; at the end of 1980 the value of direct investment by Community 
countries in the USA totalled US$ 37,800m <7>. This reversal of the trend, 
known as the 'European revenge', by no means restored balance to reciprocal 
capital relations between the Community and the United States, and certainly 
did not reverse the overall position. In 1980 American direct investment in 
the Community of US 76.6m was still twice as high as the value of European 
investments in the USA. 
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25. Advantages and disadvantages of direct investment: Certain advantages 
and disadvantages need to be taken into account when considering the 
dependence or interdependence involved in direct investment. On the one hand 
there is a danger, according to the level of the commitment of foreign 
investment, of possible foreign control of national capital assets, or at 
Least the danger of dependence of individual sectors and regions on foreign 
investment policy. On the other hand foreign companies and subsidiaries are 
subject to the Laws of the economic zone in which they are Located and in 
these areas play their part in manufacturing and employment as part of the 
prevailing economic and trade policy. The conflicts surrounding the US 
embargo policy has shown however that the US Government is seeking to extend 
its national trade policy to US subsidiaries and Licensees abroad. 
26. Public control: There is clearly a greater need for information and 
monitoring of the activities of multinational companies on both sides of the 
Atlantic as shown by the Vredeling directive and the American Interagency 
Committee on Foreign Investment. In addition to the reasons given above there 
are the strategic market advantages associated with the organization of these 
companies which quite often Lead to distortions of competition. Freedom of 
action in the transfer of goods and capital confers advantages, in particular 
to American corporations in the Community, inasmuch as they are able- until 
such time as there is European unity - to exploit specific features of the 
individual European countries (taxation, economic Laws, demand patterns) for 
their market strategies. 
27. Summary: The one-sidedness of the dependence in Euro-American capital 
relationships has shifted slightly in favour of Community. A great deal of 
the capital outflow from the Community in the 70's was absorbed by the United 
States. Despite this reversal of the trend, there remains a clear dominance 
of the United States in the Euro-American relationship as regards direct 
investment. It would therefore be mistaken - although the degree of imbalance 
in transatlantic capital relations and in the sphere of bilateral trade has 
declined - to see the position of the United States as weak or on the 
defensive. 
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IV. AREAS OF EUROPEAN-AMERICAN CONFLICT 
THE STEEL SECTOR 
28. Relations have been strained in the steel sector for a number of years 
now. As the US balance of steel trade is in deficit and the Community 
succeeded in expanding its share of the US market in the 70's, the interests 
of American industry Lie primarily in protection against European and Japanese 
competition <and competition from newly industrialized countries>. 
29. During recent years it proved possible to bring a number of the 
anti-subsidy and anti-dumping suits, which were chiefly directed at steel 
imports from the Community, to an end only after the western European trading 
partners had made concessions. Thus towards the end of 1980 the trigger price 
mechanism was reintroduced at a higher level, and after protracted 
negotiations the Member States of the Community agreed on 21 October 1982 to a 
self-restraint agreement that reduced the European share of the American steel 
market in ten ordinary steel products from an average 6.3 to 5.756 ~. This 
represents a 'voluntary' reduction of Community steel exports to the USA of 
8 8 %. The agreement runs from 1 November 1982 to 31 December 1985 • 
30. Assessment: Steel subsidies within the Community range up to 30 % in 
France and 40 % in the United Kingdom. Although these subsidies do not have a 
direct bearing on exports, they nevertheless influence the European steel 
exporters' price margins on third markets. It was therefore hardly to be 
expected that the countervailing and anti-dumping duties imposed by the US 
would be abolished or even considerably reduced despite vociferous European 
protests. Nor could further disruptions of the market as a result of fresh 
suits filed by US steel manufacturers be ruled out. As the American market is 
the major export market for the Community steel industry, it was necessary to 
take steps to maintain and protect it. 
The agreement was to provide clear-cut arrangements for regulating trade in 
the carbon steel tor over three years, thus preventing disruptions until the 
European steel industry has concluded its projected rationalization and 
restructuring. 
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31. Although the Carbon Steel Arrangement of 21 October 1982 has so far 
worked to the satisfaction of both sides, the suit filed by Bethlehem Steel 
Corporation in late January this year against foreign steel imports has given 
rise to great concern in the Community. Bethlehem is one of the 15 producers 
which, when the carbon steel arrangement was signed, undertook to drop all 
dumping suits against the Community and not to apply for any additional duties 
for the duration of the arrangement. 
Legally, the International Trade Commission (ITC) has over 90 days to examine 
the complaint, and neither its recommendation to the President nor his 
~ 
decision can be predicted. However it is clearly in the interests of the US 
steel industry and Administration to uphold the steel arrangement. The 
Administration (Department of Commerce) takes the view that the Bethlehem suit 
is an isolated case, not likely to be followed by the other producers and, 
anyway, is directed not against the European steel exporters but against cheap 
suppliers in Korea and Brazil for example. If this suit did nevertheless lead 
to measures infringing the steel arrangement, the Commission has made it known 
that it would consider unilaterally terminating the arrangement. 
32. Special steel In July 1983, after a number of anti-dumping and 
anti-subsidy suits against imports of certain steel products, the US 
authorities introduced special tariffs of 8-10% and import quotas, for a 
four-year period on a degressive basis, on various foreign special steels in 
order to protect American industry. While some of the supplying countries 
concerned (including Sweden, Japan, Canada, Austria and Spain) responded to 
the new barriers to trade by complying with American offers of •voluntary• 
restraint agreements, the Community refused on grounds of principle and policy 
to adopt this course. The Community doubted whether these restrictions were 
in conformity with the GATT and called on the USA for adequate compensation. 
As several rounds of negotiations under the aegis of the GATT failed to 
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produce agreement because of the inadequacy of the American offers of 
compensation, the Community decided, after considerably lengthening the 
deadlines normal under the GATT, to take compensatory countermeasures. 
33. Retaliation by the Community: On 15 January the Commission notified the 
GATT in Geneva of a List of retaliatory measures on imports from the USA, to 
take effect after a further 45-day negotiating deadline on 1 March. The 
retaliation takes s)milar form to the US measures, and comprises increased 
duties and quantitative restrictions on imports of chemical products (man-made 
fibres and petrochemical products>, sports equipment <rifles, guns and skis) 
and burglar alarms, anti-theft devices and fire alarms. The American side has 
never questioned the Community's right to retaliate, but rather expected it 
after the fruitless rounds of consultation. The US Administration has 
nevertheless protested against the Community's action. A compromise has 
emerged with agreement on the exchange rate relationships (current exchange 
rates>, and the USA agreeing that compensation be calculated on the basis of 
EEC import rather than US export statistics. As the US products concerned are 
very price-sensitive, the Community has agreed to periodic reviews so that the 
measures do not have more than the originally planned effect. 
34. Structural crisis in the steel industry. The main reason for the 
persistent disputes with the United States on steel, notwithstanding the very 
high subsidies for steel production in some Community countries, is the crisis 
in the steel industry on both sides of the Atlantic. The US steel industry in 
particular, with exceedingly low production capacity utilization and over 30 X 
unemployment, is fighting for its life. But in the Community too, 247,000 
jobs in the steel industry were lost between 1974 and 1981. 
35. Although the acute disputes on carbon and special steels have so far been 
defused, it still remains to be seen how the problem of the structural crisis 
in the steel sector can be solved. There is enormous surplus capacity on both 
sides of the Atlantic. Both steel industries are receiving subsidies. The 
danger that these subsidies will simply serve to maintain obsolete structures 
is however considerable on past form. One important aim must therefore be to 
use the period of comparative quiet on the steel front effectively to adapt 
and modernize plant. If this is not done the problems are likely to recur 
even more seriously in a few years. 
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36. The Commission has a plan for rationalizing the European steel industry 
by 1985/86 essentially based on a quota and target price system with a 
gradual reduction in surplus capacity. Whether this can be implemented on 
schedule, however, is open to question given the understandably divergent 
interests of different parts of the industry. If the Community does not 
succeed in carrying out the necessary adjustments, however, there is the 
long-term danger that exports of ordinary steel to the world market and 
possibly to the American market too will no longer be possible even at the 
present Limited Level. 
37. Conclusions: the course of past steel conflicts with the United States 
has demonstrated the need for common action and a joint approach by the EEC 
institutions if there are to be successful negotiations with the USA on the 
basis of the EEC and the ECSC Treaties, with results that can be implemented 
internally. Despite the success in settling the worst disputes, new conflicts 
over steel may still emerge between the EEC and the USA. 
H~wever, the problems of the US steel industry cannot be solved at the expense 
'~' 
of,the already small share of the market held by the European steel 
exporters. The outcome of the negotiations on carbon steel and the measures 
in retaliation to the barriers to European special steel exports must 
therefore be welcomed, and the Commission should again be given unreserved 
support in its negotiations in future conflicts. The Commission's approach of 
avoiding escalation where possible, but using the GATT rules to show its 
American opposite numbers that there are clear limits to goodwill, must also 
be endorsed. The rapporteur believes that there will have to be negotiations 
under the GATT on maximum permissible limits to government subsidies and how 
they are defined, to attack one of the principal causes of trade disputes with 
the present world over-capacity. 
AGRICULTURAL SECTOR 
38. The Community is the Largest importer of agricultural produce in the 
world and the Largest customer for American agricultural products. Although 
there was general acceptance of Community agricultural policy by the signatory 
states after the conclusion of the Tokyo round of GATT (1973-1979), American 
pressure on the CAP has been growing over the Last few years. 9 It is 
claimed that: 
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1. The Community is making access to the common market more difficult for 
American agricultural exports by its protectionist tendencies, and its 
Mediterranean and enlargement policies are a threat to American exports of 
citrus fruits and vegetable oils to Europe. 
2. The Community has unfairly expanded its share of the world market at the 
expense of US exports by subsidized exports. 
39. Stage reached in talks on agriculture between the EEC and the USA: there 
were several rounds of high-Level talks between the Community and the United 
States in 1983 on differences over trade in agricultural products. 
In Late June 1983 they agreed to set up a joint expert working party to work 
in regular dialogue to clear up problems over definitions of farm subsidies by 
the end of 1983 and to help reduce political tension over agricultural trade 
policies. Its terms of reference include establishing a basis for joint rules 
on the trade in agricultural products to comply with the GATT. One object of 
these bilateral preliminary clarifications is to ease the work of the GATT 
agriculture committee. 
40. The American export drive: From the beginning the agricultural talks 
were however overshadowed by the US export drive in traditional Community 
markets in the Mediterranean area. In January 1983 the USA concluded a 
contract to supply Egypt, traditionally a major customer for European wheat 
and wheat flour, with over 1 million tonnes of wheat flour at a price up to 
US$ 30 per tonne below the world market price. In August 1983 there was 
another subsidized transaction in which the USA sold Egypt 18,000 tonnes of 
butter and 10,000 tonnes of cheese. Such 'shots across the bows• clearly 
serve the Americans• interest in persuading the Community to restrict its 
agricultural subsidies so that its farmers' earnings are, like the American 
farmers•, more subject to the fluctuations of the world market. The 
Commission has launched a protest against these export practices with the 
International Dairy Council and notified the GATT that it is asking for 
compensation for the sales to Egypt. In October 1983 400,000 tonnes of French 
wheat flour were sold to Egypt. The Community granted extra amounts on top of 
the normal export refunds to win back part of the Egyptian market. The US 
mills cannot understand why the sales to Egypt should not be repeated. They 
are therefore expecting a follow-up contract. However, members of the US 
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Congress and Administration regard it as impossible on grounds of costs alone 
to conduct a prolonged price war between the US and the EEC in specific 
markets. There is therefore an interest on both sides of the Atlantic to 
promote an escalating farm exports war. 
41. The world market position of the Community: The United States is 
noticeably feeling threatened by European competition in its agricultural 
export policy. And indeed over the last few years the Community has become 
one of the leading exporters of dairy and egg products, poultry and wheat. It 
has overtaken the traditional exporters of beef, Argentina and Australia, and 
in the case of sugar is in second place behind Cuba. The United States on the 
other hand exports relatively little butter, sugar, milk or beef. But it has 
a dominant position on the world market for soya beans, maize and cereals. 
42. The expansion of the European share of the world market is clearly the 
result of a common agricultural policy with sales guarantees and support 
prices which Leads to surplus and pressure to export. 
In the past it has been very difficult to prove how much the Community's 
export subsidies have cost the US on world markets, and Last year a GATT panel 
which at the request of the USA, examined the Community's wheat flour exports 
to 17 markets for allegedly unfair export practices was unable to prove that 
the EEC had offered lower prices or obtained a disproportionate market share 
by granting export refunds. It should also be said, in reply to the American 
accusations, that farming in the USA itself is not untainted by official 
interference and subsidies. Subsidies in the USA as a proportion of GDP are 
about the same as in the Community, and even higher per capita of those 
working on the land. 
43. The crisis in American farming: One major reason for the conflict 
between the United States and the Community is not so much the Community's 
agricultural policy as the crisis in US farming. Record harvests in the USA, 
the rise of cereal production abroad, the fall in demand due to the worldwide 
recession, the high value of the dollar and not Least the effects of the 
cereal embargo have led to a drop in farm earnings and a decline in US 
exports. Farmers in the US are therefore calling on the Federal Government 
for more support measures and for enhanced export aids and measures against 
European competition on third markets and on the domestic market. 
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44. wine: the Wine Equity Act of 1983 provides an example of the efforts of 
the farm lobby. It is now before the US Congress and its aim is to establish 
reciprocity in trade in wine. Not only does this bill contravene the 
international trade rules of the GATT, it threatens the Community's wine 
exports to the USA, which are the largest individual item in the Community's 
agricultural exports to that market, amounting to $668 million in 1982. So 
far the Commission has protested against the bill and expressed its hope that 
the US Administration will resist the Californian wine lobby. 
45. After the first votes in the Congress it looks as if the bill might get a 
majority. The representatives of soya and maize gluten interests are now 
opposing it, as they fear that its adoption could produce direct EEC 
restrictions on feedstuff substitutes and vegetable oils and fats, one of the 
objectives of Community reform policy. This fear is the mirror image of the 
endeavours of some US farm lobbyists, independently of the motives of 
Community reformers policies, to reply to EEC attempts to stabilize feedstuff 
imports by retaliatory measures against European wine imports. At the moment 
the Wine Equity Bill could still become law, but its opponents are gaining 
strength. 
Dumping suits were filed against European wine imports a few weeks ago on the 
basis of complaints by Californian wine growers represented by the American 
Grape Growers Alliance. About $300 million worth of French and Italian table 
wines could have been affected by possible anti-dumping measures. The US 
growers' main argument was that European table wine exports were being 
inadmissibly subsidised. The ITC has however turned down the complaints for 
lack of proof of damage to US wine producers. It should however be pointed 
out that the Community does no promoting of wine exports and that national 
structural aid within the Community is calculated to avoid distortions of 
competition. 
46. The US wine industry's sales problems should be blamed less on European 
competition than on the huge rise in US wine production and the strength of 
the dollar in recent years, which has helped imports and hampered exports. 
Even if American wines could reach the common market with lower compensatory 
levies, at their price level their chances of competing would not be 
improved. Moreover, US wines are made by processes which do not conform with 
European regulations. In order to accommodate the American growers and, in 
particular, to anticipate demands for reciprocity as contained in the Wine 
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Equity Act, in July 1983 the Commission sought an agreement in letter form 
with the US Government on the assimilation of the different regulations and 
considered facilitating access of American wines to the European market. The 
US Administration <trade representative Brock) which opposed the Wine Equity 
Act from the beginning, would then have something to show the Congress. Since 
then the Administration has held back for electoral reasons, and the 
Commission has temporarily frozen offers of this nature ,probably as a 
result. 
47. US criticism of Community reform policy: as instructed by the Stuttgart 
European Council, the Commission submitted a List of reforms on 1 August 1983, 
for the most part combining internal adaptation to reduce costs (quotas, price 
thresholds, phasing out of subsidies) with a stabilization of agricultural 
imports in sensitive areas <feedingstuff substitutes etc.> 11 Some of these 
proposals were misinterpreted as attacks on the American farmer as the most 
affected Community supplier. For the objects of the package of reforms, to 
reduce the volume of production, to encourage European farmers to share the 
responsibility for surpluses and to close the gap between EEC and world market 
prices, are in fact in the interest of US agriculture. American warnings of a 
trade war if these adaptations are carried out, and if US export interests are 
affected, are unjustified for the following reasons: 
48. Feedingstuff substitutes: the Community's imports of maize gluten alone 
have risen from 700,000 to 3 million tonnes over the last ten years. Cheap 
feedingstuff substitutes Like maize gluten and citrus pellets have largely 
replaced dearer Community-produced feedingstuffs, and in turn stimulated the 
rise in cereals and dairy surpluses which the Community could dispose of only 
on the world market. Guarantee thresholds for cereals and stabilization of 
feedingstuff substitute imports are not intended to damage US exports, but to 
stimulate consumption of homegrown cereal products and to reduce Community 
surpluses, which would reduce supply to the world market. Despite the 
widely-held view to the contrary in the USA, there is no intention of imposing 
a ban on or reduction of imports of grain substitutes, but rather of 
stabilizing traditional patterns of trade in conformity with the rules of the 
GATT <Articles 11, 19 and 28). As the Community has made special agreements 
with the United States under the GATT concerning the import of feedingstuffs, 
stabilization measures to be proposed by the Commission would not be adopted 
without negotiations with the USA over possible compensation from the 
Community. 
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49. Tax on oils and fats: the Commission's proposal to introduce a tax on 
oils and fats to reduce the butter mountain is being misinterpreted in the USA 
as an attempt by the Community to abolish the duty-free import of soya beans, 
soya flour and other oil seeds, the value of which was around $4,000 million 
in 1982. The proposed tax on consumption would be Levied on all oils and fats 
consumed in Europe, other than butter, irrespective of whether they are 
produced in the Community or imported. This proposal therefore does not 
discriminate between imported and domestic production, and would be in 
conformity with international trade rules. Whether the introduction of such a 
tax would hit soya imports at all is an open question. One reason for this 
assumption is the fact that most of the Community's soya bean imports are used 
for animal feed rather than oil production. 
50. Distribution of the cost of CAP reform: it is widely held in the USA 
that the CAP needs to be reformed, but there is no reason why the USA and its 
farm exports should pay for it. This is to ignore the fact that the main 
burden of the adjustments that have been proposed would fall on the European 
farmer. If the Community does demand greater discipline from its own farmers, 
then fair regulation of the market requires that agricultural imports are not 
exempted. This also coincides with the views of most European farmers' 
associations, which are calling for the inclusion of certain imports <e.g. 
cereal substitutes) in the common market organization system. 
51. Effects of CAP reform on external relations there will undoubtedly be. 
The Community, before deciding on specific action, should therefore give 
careful consideration to its trading partners' possible reactions. This is 
especially true of the United States, where countermeasures are being 
threatened to the introduction of the tax on oils and fats and the planned 
stabilization of feedingstuffs and soya imports is being taken as a 
declaration of war. 
As American farming is heavily dependent on exports and an extremely sensitive 
part of the American domestic political system, in an election year we can 
expect to see the US Administration prepared to use every means at its 
disposal to further American interests. It is therefore essential to keep 
American eyes firmly fixed on the Link between the need for internal 
adaptations while stabilizing imports, and the relief this will bring to 
international markets. 
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52. This is a particularly unfortunate time for agricultural problems between 
the Community and the USA. The Community is about to embark on a period of 
reform, and the US as we know is in the middle of an election year. As the 
farm vote is very important in the presidential election, the waves might be 
bigger than usual at certain points of conflict. The Community should bear 
this in mind. On the other hand there is no reason to give the US the power 
of veto over reforms intended to adapt the Community's 20 year old 
agricultural policy to changed financial and external circumstances. It is 
therefore not a question of whether the Community should adopt individual 
reforms or not as part of an overall concept, but how to prepare for their 
introduction by conducting an intensive dialogue with the trading partners 
affected. 
53. Conclusions: the Community should continue its efforts to arrive at 
solutions acceptable to both sides concerning trade in agricultural products. 
In addition to bilateral talks at expert Level there is the possibility of 
cooperation in the newly created GATT agricultural committee. Arrangements 
with the USA should be sought under the GATT taking both parties' Legitimate 
interests in world markets into account, and to help stabilize world trade in 
agricultural products. As the production of surpluses also represents a major 
problem in the USA, efforts should be made in the interest of both sides 
towards parallel reductions in subsidies. 
V. EAST-WEST ECONOMIC RELATIONS 
54. In 1982 the difference of opinion between Western Europe and the USA in 
relation to trade with the Eastern Bloc flared up and, in conjunction with the 
steel dispute, tested transatlantic relations to the utmost. On 18 June 1982 
because of the Polish crisis President Reagan tightened the sanctions against 
the Soviet Union and extended the embargo on the supply of pipeline equipment 
to US subsidiaries and licensees in Europe. This represented an inadmissible 
extraterritorial extension of American law and an attempt to break existing 
agreements. In two notes of protest, the Community drew attention to these 
legal aspects and called on the US authorities to withdraw the measures they 
had imposed12• 
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55. Raising of the pipeline embargo: The attitude: of the US administration 
only changed when they found they were unable to enforce their will on the 
Europeans. The European firms concerned began to fulfil their contractual 
obligations to the Soviets despite American threats of fines and a ban on the 
sale of sophisticated US technology. They not only received wide support from 
other businesses, trade unions and Community institutions but often were given 
clear instructions to do so by their governments. President Reagan 
increasingly found himself confronted by domestic difficulties as a result of 
the damage caused to the alliance and the economy by his sanctions (for 
example the US Caterpillar Corporation alone had to make 8,000 workers 
redundant because of being excluded from the pipeline deal), and abandoned the 
sanctions against the construction of the gas pipeline on 13 November 1982. 
The ending of the pipeline dispute clearly. s.howed that by sticking together 
the European States had managed to defend their interests even against massive 
American resistance, and this also had to be accounted a success for the 
Community. 
56. Energy supplies: The Community has devoted a great deal of attention to 
the repeated American argument that Western Europe risks becoming dependent on 
Russiar.t energy supplies. In three comprehensive commun·i cations to the CounciL 
on the security of the Community's gas suppli•es13 the Commission pointed out 
that even today a Loss of 25% of. our supplies for a period of six months could 
be covered without noticeable effect on iiinal conswnpti·on. It also 
recommended increased prospecting for domestic reserves for extreme 
circumstances, aid for the development of synthetic na-tural gas and further 
diversification of foreign sources. of supply. ln i-ts memorandum of 12 August 
1982 to the US Government the Communi-ty a-Lso. stated that Soviet gas supplies 
at their peak would not ex.ceed. 4%. of the· Cornmuni't~' s total energy 
consumption. This is scarcely a Level of dependence threatening security or 
providing scope for political bla.ckma.il •. 
57. Credit policy: The limi~ation or restriction of the volume of Loans to 
Eastern Bloc countries favoured. by the United States is unlikely to be 
considered in the medium term. The problem of indebtedness among Comecon 
States has already Led to· a fa·r more restrained and cautious credit policy and 
any further restrictions would represent an unne-ce·ssary burden on trade with 
the East which is already stagnating. The Community has already acceded to 
the American wish for higher interest rates on Loans to the Eastern Bloc. 
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On 30 June 1982, the Council of Economic and Financial Ministers accepted OECD 
proposals that the USSR, Czechoslovakia, the GDR <and Israel) should be 
included in Group I of prosperous industrial countries with a per capita GNP 
of over 4,000 dollars. The Socialist countries concerned thus had to accept a 
dual rise in interest rates: firstly as a result of their higher 
classification and secondly a general increase in interest rates (for example 
in the case of loans with a 2 to 5 year term by 1.15 to 12.15%>. 14 
Since then the transatlantic differences over the rate of interest, term and 
amount of subsidy in loans to Eastern Bloc countries have practically been 
settled. The Autumn 1983 new OECD consensus on export credits (Wallen 
proposal), reached after considerable wrangling within the EEC, provides for 
automatic adjustment of minimum interest rates to market trends and largely 
avoids a credit war. 
58. Export control policy: there is general recognition among western 
countries that export controls under the aegis of CoCom are necessary on 
security grounds and that the lists of prohibited exports have to be updated 
from time to time. The Western European countries have however resisted 
stricter controls on products which also have civil uses (semi-conductors, 
microprocessors, glass fibre cable, computers, etc.) and any extension of 
CoCom's powers. If it were made more difficult to export products with 
electronic components, EEC Member States• exports to Eastern Bloc countries of 
semi-automatic or numerically controlled machines could be seriously affected. 
59. Export Administration Act: independently of the voting procedure in 
CoCom <consensus~), the US is attempting unilaterally to refine the methods of 
export control. After prolonged debates the US Senate has now passed a new 
version of the 1979 Export Administration Act very much on the lines of the 
amendments proposed by the Administration, and laying down much stricter 
export controls than did the version approved by the House of Representatives 
Last year. The two Houses have until 31 March this year to agree on a joint 
text. The version adopted by the Senate provides that foreign firms which 
violate American export bans on strategically relevant products are in future 
not only as now to be prevented from acquiring American products but are also 
to be cut off from the American market. There is however no longer to be 
retroactive imposition of trade sanctions. In the case of contracts already 
concluded, there is to be a conditional period of grace of 270 days. The 
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provision for the US Department of Commerce to withhold export Licences until 
foreign subsid1aries or partners contractually un'deH:ake to accept American 
trade regulations is however maintained. Bearing in mihd the pipeline embargo 
which President Reagan extended to Euro~eah firms on the basis of the old 1979 
Export Administration Act, the Commission and Council have protested on 
several occasions against the extra-territorial claims of the Act, which are 
incompatible with international Law. The Community made two approaches in 
1983, warning of the consequences of this Act, ~hich could involve uncertainty 
in international trade, reservations over US foreign investment and an 
increased tendency for European industry to strive for independence of 
American technology15 • 
60. Export controls on foreign policy g~ounds: another major problem is that 
the ne~ act allows export controls for foreign ~olicy as well as security 
reasons. As this is not covered by Articles 20 and 21 of the GATT, the 
Community has pointed out to the US Administration that whenever measures with 
extra-territorial effect are adbpted bn foreigh p6Li~y grounds under the 
Export Administration Act and affect the Communityis trade, it reserves the 
right to make full use of the GATT. The Community would if possible prefer to 
avoid disputes over export control policy, but the text of the act as adopted 
by the Senate gives rise to the danger that US control me~~ures involving 
extra-territorial clai~s could in futu~e Lead to political difficulties in 
transatlantic relations, and could be econo·micatly harmful. 
61. US technological domination: In ~ecent ye~r~ the problem of technology 
transfers to the Eastern Bloc has beeh joined by problems over technological 
cooperation within t'h·e western wortd. The US is clearly anxious to protect 
its technological Lead in key areas against the 6utside w·orld. This is true 
even Of cooperation proje'cts within trATO. It i's therefore becoming more and 
more difficult to determine whether restHctions ·o·n the transfer of advanced 
technology are intended to increas·e its lead over the Eastern Bloc alone, or 
over its western trading partners too. This will make it more difficult to 
distinguish between purely protective measures t6 safeguard US domination in 
advanc'ed technology and measures to prevent th-e tran·sf'er of technology to the 
Eastern Bloc. On these grounds alone the Community should endeavour to 
increase its technological independence and, by appropriate aid programmes 
(particularly for computer and information technology) to increase its ability 
to co~ete with the USA and Japan. 
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62. Conclusions: Given that the CSCE Final Act cited trade relations as one 
of the guiding principles of East-west cooperation, and the Community wishes 
to expand these relations <see Community agreement with Rumania, negotiations 
with Hungary>, there is no reason to depart from this policy. The Western 
Europeans are however bound to coordinate their approach to a certain extent 
with the United States for reasons of security and the alliance. This does not 
alter the fact that the differences of opinion on economic relations with the 
Eastern bloc are inbuilt. The USA sees relations with the Soviet Union 
primarily from the point of view of the global competition between the 
superpowers whereas in Europe the emphasis is on regional aspects. America 
and Europe will have to learn to Live with their differences on East-West 
economic relations. Both on economic and political grounds (jobs, 
diversification of energy supplies, detente>, therefore, the Community should 
maintain its policy on East-West economic relations and point out to the 
Americans that unilateral measures (Export Administration Act> and pressures 
represent an unnecessary burden on the alliance and make it harder to find 
compromises on matters of detail. 
VI. MONETARY AND INTEREST RATE POLICY 
63. For over two years the high Level of American interest rates and the rise 
in the value of the dollar have hindered economic and monetary policy in 
Europe. At the same time fluctuations in the dollar exchange rate have 
created uncertainty in international trade and disrupted the foreign exchange 
markets. High US interest rates have attracted foreign capital, which has 
recently been helping finance the economic recovery and growth in the USA. In 
Europe on the other hand there has been a Lack of capital for the investment 
that is required and interest rates have been higher than justified by 
circumstances within Europe. Interest rates have since fallen from their 1981 
peak, but they are still too high in relation to the past, and uncertainty 
persists concerning trends in the USA. This is Largely due to the tensions in 
the capital markets created by deficits in the US Federal budget. The 
Americans are beginning to discuss Limiting their deficits, but it is unlikely 
that the necessary tax rises and spending cuts will take place in an election 
year. 
WG/2/0407E - 25 - PE 84.569/fin.B 
OR.DE. 
64. European criticism: European criticism in the past has La~gely focussed 
on the gearing of the Reagan Administration's economic policy to the domestic 
market, which has given high priority to regaini·ng price stabiLity while 
waiving controls on interest rates and encouraging a high dollar exchange 
rate. At past economic summits the Europeans have tried to obtain 
undertakings from the Americans on their international role as the leading 
political power and to encourage them to Limit budget defitits and reduce 
interest rates. The Europeans' main hopes were for US willingness to intervene 
on the currency markets to iron out fluctuations in the dollar exchange rate 
and maintain 'orderly market conditions' to relieve the pressure on European 
currencies. (16) 
65. Dangers in the US budget deficit: After the dollar reached record values 
in January this year, the trend on the currency markets abruptly went into 
reverse; between February and mid-JIIIarch, the dollar fell by about 10%. The 
markets were obviously adapting to the uncertai~ty over the Reagan 
Administration's future economic policy in the ti~ht of Americats huge Federal 
budget and trade deficits. According to the US federat Reserve Bank, a 
capital inflow of $80,000 million, twice last year•s figure, will be required 
to meet the demand for credit this year. As foreign holders of capital do not 
seem prepared to finance unlimited US deficits in the long term, if the budget 
is not cut there is a danger that with capital in greater demand there could 
be an escalation of interest rates with all its international economic 
implications. 
66. European monetary policy: Given the continuing uncertainty as regards US 
budgetary and monetary policy, a major question is the extent to which better 
monetary policy cooperation between the Member States of the Community could 
counter the dominant role of the US currency in the world economy and enable 
Europe to contribute to stabilizing the international monetary and financial 
system. The EMS which has existed since March 1979 is a major step towards 
achieving economic and monetary union within the Community. In the five years 
of its existence it has succeeded in stabilizing ex,hange rate relations 
between the participating currencies, whereas for example the dollar and the 
yen have been extremely volatile. Despite seven adjustments to the central 
rates, it is obvious that the participants valued the role of the EMS. It has 
provided undeniable discipline towards harmonization of national economic 
policies. The recent improvement in monetary cooperation has also made it 
possible to reduce the considerable differences within the Community in 
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balance of payments deficits and rates of inflation. The Community does 
however Lack an effective instrument of monetary policy in its external 
relations. There is inadequate coordination of exchange rate policies towards 
other currencies, and no Community organization, similar to those in the 
commercial or agricultural field, to play the role due to the Community in the 
developing system of multiple reserve currencies. 
67. Improvements proposed by the Commission: The Commission therefore 
regards an improvement in the consultation and cooperation machinery between 
European central banks and those in the US and Japan as necessary to stabilize 
the Community's external monetary policy and recommends closer coordination 
between Community central banks in dollar interventions so as to achieve a 
more coherent approach to the u.s. currency. The Commission is also in the 
process of drawing up a number of proposals aimed at strengthening the EMS 
internally and giving it greater capacity to withstand external influences and 
disruptions. (17> These proposals include both the present scope for 
extending the European Monetary System and also the prospects for its 
institutionalization. 
68. Conclusions: The most important concept in the Commission proposals 
referred to above is clearly the creation of a Community institution which 
would have central powers for monetary policy and the creation of a 
convertible European currency. If the Community were to extend the function 
of the ECU in this way and make it available as an international reserve 
currency and means of payment, it might in the Long term succeed in acquiring 
an influence in the monetary sphere appropriate to its economic and trading 
power. Total separation from the dollar is however neither desirable nor 
realistic given the international dominance of American economic power. 
For the time being your rapporteur recommends the following: Parliament 
should support the Commission's initiatives for strengthening cooperation 
within the EMS and appeal to the Council of Ministers to adopt measures to 
harmonize the economic policies of the Member States so as to create more 
favourable conditions for the more stable operation of the EMS. In its 
external relations, the Community should continue to make every attempt 
vis-a-vis the other major currencies to achieve effective coordination of 
interest rate and exchange rate policies. Particularly as regards the USA, 
the Community should strongly urge limits on US budget deficits, a more active 
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policy of intervention by the US monetary authorities and a reorganization of 
the internat'ional monetary system. The economi-c summit this year in London 
would be a suitable opportunity for this. The EMS machinery might serve as a 
model for stabilization of the international monetary system. 
VII. WORLD ECONOMIC ASPECTS 
PROBLEMS IN GATT 
69. The GATT system was set up in 1947 at the initiative of the USA as a 
global approach to liberalizing world trade. Combined with the Bretton Woods 
monetary system it provided for 25 years the basis for prosperity, an increase 
in affluence and an enormous expansion of worl.d trad·e. The major rounds of 
GATT negotiations were the Dillon Round, the Kennedy Round and the Tokyo Round 
(1973-1979). 
70. The importance of the Tokyo Round: At the last of the abovementioned 
major negotiations, the USA wanted to gain better a~cess to European markets 
and at the same time international acceptance of the possibility of protective 
measures for sections of the American economy which were no Longer 
competitive. From this point of view th~ conclusi6n of the Tokyo Round was 
thoroughly satisfactory for the United States. The general adoption of the 
subsidy and countervailing duties code by the parties to the GATT Treaty 
sanctioned protectionist measures a~ainst artificially cheap imports. 
The Community succeeded in gaining what amounted to formal recognition of its 
agricultural policy and was able to obtain a harmonization of duties at a 
Lower level <according to the Swiss Formula>. ~oreover in the context of the 
subsidy code the United States recognized for the first time the criteria of 
'material injury' in the context of countervailing or relief measures. 
71. Certain problems emerged in implementing the agreements reached in the 
Tokyo Round principally in relation to different interpretations of the GATT 
subsidy code and the Community's agricultural policy which Led to a number of 
complaints being lodged by the Community and the United States against each 
other in GATT. Thus in 1983 there were GATT panel ehquiries into pasta, wheat 
flour and citrus fruits, for example, some of which have not yet been 
completed. The Community also lodged a complaint against the subsidizing 
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with GATT by amendments submitted to Congress by the US Government (Foreign 
Sales Corporation). Even if this happens, the Community will pursue the 
question of whether the USA is prepared to pay compensation for past tax 
concessions to help exporters. 
72. The GATT ministerial conference in November 1982: The main items under 
discussion at this first meeting of the parties of GATT for 9 years were the 
problems created by the Tokyo Round and the issue of a worldwide increase in 
non-tariff obstacles to trade. The main subjects discussed were trade in 
agricultural goods, the application of the safeguard clause, the procedure for 
settling disputes and the inclusion of trade and services in GATT.(19) 
73. In the discussion of agriculture the main aspect was criticism by the 
United States and other countries of the Community's practice of subsidizing 
exports and its protectionist tendencies in the agricultural sector. The 
Community's concern was to avoid a general round of negotiations on 
agricultural matters and to support the creation of an agricultural committee 
within GATT. This newly-established committee now intends to conclude its 
survey of national notifications of barriers to trade and export subsidies and 
to draw up proposals for solutions to be submitted to the annual meeting of 
GATT in November this year for decision. 
74. In relation to the safeguard clause (Article 19 GATT) it was not possible 
as the USA and other parties to the Treaty wished to improve the criteria for 
applying protective measures 'erga omnes'. And the Community failed before as 
it had already done on previous attempts at GATT, to achieve selective use of 
the safeguard clause with stricter guidelines. Presumably therefore the 
practice of bilateral 'self-restraint agreements' will remain an area of 
ambiguity. 
75. Various proposals for reforming the arbitration procedure and rules for 
settling disputes (in which principally the USA and Canada are interested) 
were discussed. Disputes which cannot be settled between the two parties are 
normally referred to courts of arbitration set up by the GATT Council which 
passes on the results of their investigations to the Council. Whereas some 
countries wish to give the GATT Council the status of a court with powers of 
sanction, the Community does not favour all too frequent use of arbitration 
tribunals and advocated maintaining the principle of consensus. 
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76. The main topic in relation to services was the call from the USA to 
abolish obstacles to trade in services. Trade in 'invisibles', in which the 
US Leads, already represents roughly a third of world trade. The Community 
favoured studies on the scope for extending GATT provisions in this direction. 
77. Outcome of the GATT Conference: in view of the stagnation in 
international trade and the increasing trend towares protectionism, the GATT 
Conference took place in an unfavourable climate. The negotiations for a 
final policy declaration acknowledging the principles of free trade were 
therefore difficult. In the end a final communique was adopted including a 
political declaration on restricting protectionism, strengthening the GATT 
system and a work programme for the 80s involving procedures and studies20• 
78. New GATT Round: the US has recently been displaying interest in setting 
up a new GATT Round for the Late 80s or early 90s, the objective of which 
would be, by a kind of roll-back strategy, to achieve something more like free 
and fair trade, and to resolve a number of outstanding sectoral problems in 
steel, textiles and, in particular, agriculture. The US believes that one of 
GATT's greatest failures has been the absence in the past of multilateral 
negotiations on major aspects of international economic relations and related 
problems, viz. the inadequate Liberalization of trade in services and advanced 
technology and the barriers to foreign invest~ent. Representatives of the US 
Administration take the view that it would be easier to find a solution to the 
problem of the indebtedness of the developing countries, which is an 
impediment to world trade, if the markets in those countries were open to 
capital from the industrialized countries. The same could be said of the 
trade in services and the transfer of advanced technology, which are different 
in nature from the trade in steel or agricultural products. 
79. Position of the Community: A new round of multilateral GATT negotiations 
would be in the Community's interest, but it insists that the agreements under 
the Tokyo Round are fully implemented. The Community therefore took steps to 
have the tariff reductions decided under the Tokyo Round brought forward, a 
move welcomed by the us 21 • After initial doubts about the US proposal for 
talks on the scope for Liberalizing the trade in services, the Community's 
interest in this topic has grown, as a result of research by the Commission. 
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The Community still sees a number of problems over the other topics proposed, 
such as advanced technology, the trade in agricultural products, and foreign 
investment, especially as regards the willingness of the developing countries 
to negotiate. The Commission believes that a new GATT round could begin no 
earlier than 1986, and then only if there is a jointly drawn up work programme 
adequately defining the objectives of the negotiations, and if the 
Less-developed countries are prepared to take part. 
80. Conclusions: given the existing problems in international trade and the 
obvious lacunae in the GATT rules, we recommend the following: 
a. The present GATT system represents a Liberal system of world trade with 
protectionist exceptions. The Large number of exceptions makes it necessary 
to define stricter guidelines in respect of non-tariff obstacles to trade to 
stem protectionist 'proliferation' and make it subject to internationally 
binding criteria. 
b. Clearly the causes of trade conflict need to be tackled as a matter of 
urgency, in view of the need for the industrialized countries to modernize and 
rationalize a whole range of their industries which are clearly no Longer 
competitive. Agreement should therefore be reached under GATT to allow a 
limited period of grace for the progressive and coordinated removal of 
subsidies and other forms of support to enable these problem industries 
subsequently to resume their place in free international trade. 
c. The Community should closely examine the US proposals for a new GATT 
round, which might indeed make it possible to strengthen GATT and adapt it to 
changed international circumstances. This would benefit all parties as, 
despite all difficulties, GATT has on the whole proved valuable in 
liberalizing international trade and settling disputes over trade. However, 
the Community should insist that the Tokyo Round be fully implemented before a 
new major round of negotiations begins. 
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VIII. TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT 
81. The following section considers not so much the fundamental aspects of 
the North-South conflict as the position of the Community and the United 
States in relation to certain areas of development policy. Cooperation to 
date between the Community, its Member States and the USA and international 
bodies and organizations has revealed considerable differences in some areas 
of trade and development policy, which make it difficult to find cooperative 
solutions to the urgent problems which exist. 
82. The position of the United States: Some years ago, the USA Lost interest 
in efforts to establish a 'global dialogue' and a 'new world economic order' 
to balance the interests of poor and rich countries. The Reagan 
administration's budget policy which is seeking to reduce taxation not only 
cut social programmes but also development aid. So far the US Government has 
followed an extremely restrictive course in relation to the financial 
endowment of international organizations such as the IMF or IDA. It is 
seeking to freeze or reduce their funds and impose more discipline on them. 
In the view of the Reagan Government measures to liberalize trade and capital 
transfer represent a better form of development aid than 'exaggerated' Lending 
programmes by multilateral organizations. As state development aid is highly 
unpopular at present in the US, unlike in Europe, the American attitude is to 
transfer the emphasis on development policy from the public to the private 
sector and the principles of profitability22 • In doing so the US clearly 
hopes to exploit the debt crisis to force the developing countries to stop 
discriminating against foreign investment. There is a general trend in 
American development policy away from the multinational bodies and towards 
bilateral policies. The consequences of this are to torpedo the post-war 
efforts of the United Nations and to establish close economic, political and 
military Links between the Third World countries concerned and the United 
States. 
83. The Community's programme: The Community as a whole is pursuing a policy 
of contractual trade and cooperation agreements granting preferences to 
developing countries and geared to creating social and economic stability in 
the Third World. The Community favours larger allocations of sums to 
international Lending institutions <such as the IMF> to overcome the enormous 
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financing problems of the Third World, and in its development policy 
memorandum (which is the subject of controversy within the Community) the 
Commission proposes among other things increasing development aid and 
extending EIB Loans to Third World countries 23• 
The Community is the most important trading partner of the Third World and 
interested in stabilizing export earnings and action to combat hunger in the 
Third World. Unlike the superpowers, it is not interested in involving the 
Third world in the East-West conflict but far more in promoting a more 
autonomous political and economic development. The Community is pursuing a 
multipolar programme of world trade and development which brings it into 
conflict with American policy interests in Central and South America in 
particular. 
84. The situation of the developing countries: In addition to their own 
errors with over-ambitious industrialization products, in the past it has 
Largely been external factors such as Lower export earnings (because of the 
fall in prices of raw materials>, high oil prices, high rates of interest and 
massive exchange rate fluctuations which have seriously damaged the economies 
of the developing countries. In 1981 the overall debt of developing countries 
was 630,000 million dollars with over half of this consisting of Loans from 
commercial banks. Debt servicing costs in the Third World have risen so 
sharply as a result of high interest rates that even the more prosperous 
developing countries have had to restrict imports~ This has Led to a fall in 
international demand and affected the industrialized nations in turn. But, if 
the developing countries have no recourse other than curbing imports, there is 
a danger that the economies of the Third World will be cut off from the 
industrialized countries. 
85. Interest rates and currencies: For this reason the Community has 
repeatedly pointed out over the Last two years the need to stabilize the 
dollar at a Low rate by an appropriate intervention policy on the part of the 
US monetary authorities and to reduce American interest rates. Only Lower 
interest rates would relieve the debt servicing costs of the developing 
countries and reduce balance of payments deficits and the need to borrow. As 
the US budget deficits are one of the main causes of the high real interest 
Levels, the Third World, with most of its debts denominated in dollars, has 
seen its payments problems exacerbated. The US budget deficit is therefore 
one of the 
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greatest individual threats to the world economy, with its serious 
implications for interest rates, exchange rates and world trade. Export 
earnings are the only long-term solution for the debtor countries, but in the 
short term even small changes in dollar interest rates above could make all 
the difference. For example a 1% drop in interest rates alone could save 
Brazil and Mexico US$ 700 million each on servicing their debts per year. 
However the recent fall in the dollar and upward pressure on interest rates 
foreshadow change in the international markets, making it possible that 
interest rates might rise further, if the US budget and the inflow of foreign 
capital into the US remain unchecked. Higher dollar interest rates would 
jeopardize many rationalization programmes supervised by the IMF and bring the 
international debt crisis, which had only just been brought under some measure 
of control, back to the boil. 
86. IMF endowment: The Community advocates topping up international credit 
facilities, particularly the IMF. The US has however reconsidered its past 
general support for the IMF and demanded that, with its policy of Long-term 
Loans, the fund should not be converted into a development agency, but act 
within its terms of reference and give support only in the event of short-term 
balance of payments crises. The United States therefore for a Long time 
opposed increases in IMF quotas and urged instead a tighter Loan policy and 
stricter Loan terms <as decided by the interim committee last year> with the 
particular aim of persuading the heavily indebted countries to restore their 
economic and financial situations to a sounder footing. 
87. The Americans only drew nearer to the position of most other 
industrialized countries after the Mexico crisis (about 1400 US banks and 
credit institutions are involved in Mexico>. This cleared the way for 
decisions extending IMF credit facilities by increasing the GAB (General 
Arrangements to Borrow) to 17,000 million SDRs and increasing quotas by 47% 
from 61 to 90,000 million SDRs. Thus the Europeans almost succeeded in 
achieving their objective of a 50% increase in quotas. The United States was 
obliged to make considerable concessions, not least because of high standby 
Loans for debtor countries such as Mexico, Brazil and Argentina. The agreed 
topping up of the IMF was delayed some time by the reluctance of the US 
Congress to ratify. However it now seems certain that the IMF commitments for 
1984 will be refinanced, but there might be shortfalls in 1985. 
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88. Although the agreements of the IMF Interim Committee on topping up are 
very welcome, they will probably not be sufficient. According to the 
calculations of the Institute of International Economics in Washington, the 
acute Lack of currency reserves in Third World debtor countries calls for an 
annual increase of 9,000 million SORs. The developing countries and certain 
international bodies such as the North-South Commission (Brandt Commission) 
are calling for a 100% increase in quotas, further extension of the GAB to act 
as a safety net and recourse by the Fund to self financing on private capital 
markets24• This has encountered strong resistance particularly in the US 
Congress and Administration. Consideration should nevertheless be given 
within the Community to whether the IMF should not be given more resources 
particularly because of its important role as regards the confidence of 
commercial banks to enable it to play a leading role in the debt rescheduling 
activities which will become necessary shortly and to encourage the flow of 
private capital to developing countries. 
89. Topping up the lOA: The World Bank and the lOA have financing 
difficulties because the American Government is dragging its feet on its 
financial commitments. It is also US policy to seek greater influence on the 
development policy of these institutions and to block new projects such as the 
setting up of an energy subsidiary of the World Bank which is favoured by the 
Community. In the negotiations held in January this year on the topping up of 
the lOA for the seventh time, the USA succeeded in limiting its payments to no 
more than $750 million per year and a maximum of 25% of the total of $9,000 
million for the next three years. The other 32 donor countries considered 
that the lOA, a subsidiary of the World Bank granting interest-free loans for 
terms of up to 50 years to the poorest developing countries, should be topped 
up by $12,000 million. However it has been estimated that about $16,000 
million would be required for the 1984-1987 period to support structural 
adaptation in the poorest developing countries. The seventh lOA is thus about 
25% smaller than the sixth C$12,000 million>, which itself had to be spread 
over an extra year until June 1984 because of a delay in payment from the 
USA. The recipient countries therefore have to reckon with less lOA credit. 
The US, the wealthiest donor country, has thus again cut its contribution to 
the total by about 2% compared with the last lOA term. Since the 
establishment of the lOA in 1961 the US contribution has fallen from 42 to 25%. 
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9Q. Scope for action by the Community: As the Community, the main trading 
partner of the developing countries, has a great interest in the stability of 
the international economic system, and the US is failing to show much 
enthusiasm for solutions to development and international economic problems, 
the Community should no Longer tolerate this situation. 
The Commission has therefore also pointed out the urgent need for a common 
European position in the World Bank grouping, so that influence may be brought 
to bear on the operations of these institutions, which are essential 
instruments of the Member States' presence in the Third world25 • The 
Commission also called for Community financial participation in the 
multilateral development financing institutions. Apart from this aspect, the 
Commission's proposal to extend the activities of the EIB beyond the ACP and 
Mediterranean areas, to cover energy projects in other developing countries, 
deserves support. In this connection, consideration should also be given to 
whether the Community could use its own borrowing capacity to finance 
investment in the mining and energy sectors in the developing countries. The 
Commission also proposes that the Community should be enabled to act or at 
Least initiate coordinated action in the appropriate international bodies in 
serious balance of payments crises in countries with which it has contractual 
relations. As, for trade reasons the Community has an interest in stabilizing 
the international monetary structure, a greater role should be sought for the 
EMS and the ECU as a stabilizing factor. This would be greatly helped if the 
ECU acquired the attributes of a currency, namely those of a unit of account, 
of an instrument for transactions and of a reserve asset. 
91. Conclusions: As the leading trading partner of the developing countries, 
the Community is particularly hard-hit by a decline in the international 
division of labour. It is therefore in its interests to push ahead efforts to 
solve trade and development policy problems. This means however that a common 
position must be found within the Community for the realignment of development 
policy proposed by the Commission and as recommended by the Committee on 
External Economic Relations in opinions in the past (see PE 85.298). It also 
means that the Community must assume its responsibilities as an important 
market for the developing countries. In the final analysis it is in its own 
interest, if we consider the proportion of the Community's foreign trade taken 
by the developing countries. The Community should therefore keep its market 
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open as far as possible to increased exports from the developing countries, 
within the Limits of its own scope for liberalization, and with the trend 
towards growth in the industrialized countries, make an international stand in 
favour of opening up markets and curbing industrial protectionism. 
IX. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
92. The USA has a crucial economic influence by virtue of the size of its 
economy and the Leading role of its currency throughout the world. The 
Community should therefore do everything in its power to encourage the USA to 
live up to its world economic responsibilities. The Community must cooperate 
with the USA but this does not mean that it should neglect opportunities to 
take the initiative itself or fail to make clear its divergent interests in 
areas such as development or trade with the Eastern bloc. Above all it is 
essential that the Community abandon its passive defensive role and become 
more active. More intensive world economic initiatives on the part of the 
Community are needed in this respect. Given its high Level of dependence on 
foreign trade the Community cannot afford to stand idly by and watch world 
trade decline. 
93. The pattern of trade conflicts with the United States shows that it is 
important to approach the USA with clear proposals, act together and stand 
united. The end of the 'family row' on the gas pipeline and the agreement 
with the USA on carbon steel showed that action by an individual State or 
group of States was largely ineffective while a common approach led to 
success. United the Community can achieve more in global matters relating to 
trade, monetary and foreign policy than any individual European country. 
94. Two trends are discernible at the present time: firstly, the Community 
is in danger of drifting apart because of its increasing internal economic 
problems, the extent to which individual Member States are differently 
affected by the crisis and the difficulties which arise from the policy of 
enlargement and reform. On the other hand the crisis all around increases the 
pressure on the Community to stand together and act jointly to face world 
economic challenges. This situation makes it not only possible but essential 
- and this is a central recommendation of this report - to combine a 
strengthening of the Community in its external relations with internal 
reform. The Latter relates in particular to the restructuring needed in the 
steel industry, improved monetary cooperation and the expansion of the EMS, 
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reform of the common agricultural policy and the necessary development of the 
internal market. This would increase the Community's ability to direct and 
adjust its internal affairs and encourage the process of integration. It also 
has the advantage that by combatting many of the causes, trade conflicts could 
be defused and the Community would become more resistant to attacks and 
disruptions from outside. 
95. It is unlikely that with increasing protectionist pressure and economic 
difficulties on both sides of the Atlantic there will be any reduction in the 
potential for conflict with the United States. It is more likely that a 
number of problems such as the steel sector and export administration will 
become permanent features and that conflicts such as those in the agricultural 
sector will become more pronounced. As world trade increasingly depends on 
the three major trading powers, the USA, the EEC and Japan, the survival of 
the international system depends essentially on a settlement of the disputes 
between them and a revival in the international economy. 
96. The United States has a wide array of legal provisions and instruments to 
protect its domestic industries and to pursue its external trade objectives. 
By comparison the Community is modestly equipped. Proposals have been made 
for the Community to strengthen its trade policy by introducing measures 
against unfair commercial practices. In the light of experience of disputes 
with the USA this is to be welcomed in principle, as it would consolidate the 
central powers of the Community and enhance its ability to react in the 
foreign trade field. 
97. Although the existing contacts and methods of consultation between the 
Community and the United States do work, consideration should be given to 
expanding institutional relations with the USA, and an agreement might be 
sought setting out a joint code of conduct in cases of conflict <such as no 
unilateral measures, the duty to consult the other party, standstill or 
moratorium on certain measures while negotiations are being conducted etc.). 
This would help to strengthen the Community in its external relations 
vis-a-vis the United States which would prevent unnecessary escalation. This 
could avoid or reduce the negative affects of transatlantic trade conflicts on 
the world economy and on multilateral negotiations. M~re specifically, your 
rapporteur recommends the following: 
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we welcome the Carbon Steel Arrangement with the USA and the Community's 
retaliatory measures in response to the American obstacles to European 
special steel imports, and the Commission should be supported in its 
negotiations in future disputes. The EEC-US steel agreement should be 
upheld as tar as possible, and its termination should be contemplated 
only in the case of gross violations. In view of the world overcapacity, 
negotiations should be conducted in GATT on ceilings for state subsidies 
and their progressive reduction, in order to remove one of the main 
causes of disputes over steel. 
The Community should take into consideration the effects of reforms in 
agriculture on its external relations, but should not allow itself to be 
deflected by American objections and threats from adjusting the 
agricultural policy as necessary to changed financial and external 
economic circumstances. The Community should continue to seek mutually 
satisfactory solutions by bilateral and multilateral negotiations (GATT) 
to the problems of ~rade in agricultural products. As the production of 
surpluses is a great problem for the US as well as the Community, 
guarantees of parallel reductions in subsidies should be sought in the 
interest of both sides. 
A joint policy statement on the security aspects of trade with the 
Eastern Bloc, especially the transfer of technology, would be most 
valuable to represent to the Western Alliance the Community's essential 
interests in respect of trade and detente. Despite the existing inbuilt 
differences between the US and Europe over trade with the Eastern Bloc, 
· the Community should continue to act on the basis of its interest in an 
extension of East-West economic cooperation. In particular it should 
point out to the Americans that unilateral measures <export adminis-
tration Legislation) which encroach on the sovereignty of the EEC Member 
States are not only an unnecessary burden on the alliance and a possible 
cause of economic injury, but undermine the basis of trust and the 
principle of mutual consultation in the search for compromise solutions 
to specific problems. 
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The Community should adopt measures for the external consolidation and 
internal development of the EMS while stepping up its efforts to achieve 
international coordination of exchange rate and interest rate policies 
<in particular between the monetary authorities in the USA, Japan and the 
Member States of the Community). In addition it should continue to 
exhort the USA to embark on a more active policy of intervention on 
foreign currency markets, to reduce interest rates further and to Limit 
its budget deficits in order to restrict the negative effects of American 
monetary and fiscal policy on the world economy. The Community should 
also continue to make efforts to win US support for a realignment of the 
world monetary system. The objectives might intlude agreements on 
fluctuation margins and obligations to intervene on the part of central 
banks to create more stable exchange rates and provide more certainty in 
trade. The EMS could serve as a model for international arrangements of 
this kind. 
If the GATT system is to be maintained and stfehgthened, the Community 
should work towards stricter guidelines in respttt of non-tariff barriers 
to curb protectionist proliferation and make it subject to inter-
nationally binding criteria. It should also work on a multilateral basis 
to obtain agreements for the progressive and parallel reduction of 
subsidies in problem industries over Limited adaptation periods. The US 
proposals for a new round of GATT should be e~a~ined carefully by the 
Community to ascertain whether they would strfngthen GATT and help it 
adapt itself to changed international economic circumstances. The 
Community should however insist on full implementation of the Last major 
GATT negotiations, the Tokyo Round, before the hew round begins. 
As the developing countries• main trading partn&r, the Community can no 
longer put up with the Lack of initiativi on the part of the us to solve 
the outstanding problems over trade and dtveLopment. It is therefore of 
special importance to reach a common Europ••n position in the 
multilateral development fihance institutidni; and to adopt a uniform 
view within the Community oh the Comm1aaiCH 1 S proposals for a realignment 
of development policy. In view of thl o~inoul problem of indebtedness in 
the Third world and the extreme shortage of funds in the IMF and IDA, the 
proposals to extend the scope of the Ele, to U~e Community borrowing 
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power to finance development and for the Community to be able to 
intervene in the event of severe balance of payments crises in countries 
with which it has contractual relations should be considered. 
98. In the past the Community has not always been able to assert itself in 
bilateral negotiations and conflicts with the USA or in international 
organizations and institutions to the extent justified by its role in the 
world economy. This is due both to the frequent lack of internal consensus 
and also the lack of central Community powers. But the root cause is that the 
Community has no political unity and no uniform economic policy, but simply 
powers in respect of a trade policy. The Community remains a disparate 
collection of states representing not only different interests and points of 
view in relation to the USA and other countries but also different economic 
policies and different national solutions for overcoming economic problems. 
This exacerbates the lack of economic convergence between Member States and 
the Community's scope for action in external relations is weakened by the 
divergent interests within. The only remedy is reform and consolidation of 
existing common systems and a gradual transferral of economic and foreign 
policy powers from the national to the Community level. 
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Development of EEC-US trade 1975-1982 (in ,000 m. US$) 
EEC imports EEC exports Trade balance 
1975 25.6 16.4 - 9.2 
1976 28.3 18.1 - 10.2 
1977 29.4 23.4 - 6.0 
1978 35.6 29.4 - 6.2 
1979 47.1 34.3 - 12.8 
1980 61.6 37.0 - 24.6 
1981 55.4 41.5 - 13.9 
1982 52.7 42.0 - 10.7 
Source: Eurostat: Monthly Trade Bulletin, Special edition 
quoted f~om PE 86.129/Ann. 
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Geographic distribution of US foreign trade 1975-1980 <in %) 
European Other Western Soviet Union Japan Canada Latin America 
Community European and Eastern 
Countries Europe 
Imports 
1975 17 4 1 12 23 12 
1976 15 4 1 13 22 11 
1977 15 4 1 13 20 11 
1978 17 4 1 14 19 11 
1979 16 4 1 13 19 9 
1980 14.9 4.3 0.59 12.7 17.2 12.3 
Exports 
1975 21 7 3 9 20 15 
1976 22 6 3 9 21 13 
1977 22 6 2 9 21 14 
1978 22 5 3 9 20 14 
1979 24 7 3 10 18 12 
1980 24.3 6.26 1.7 9.4 16 16.32 
Source: US Dept. of Commerce, quoted from: Commission of the European 
Communities, Directorate-General for Information, Europa information 
57/82, p. 20 
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US foreign trade with the Community and the World 1970-1980 (in ,000 m. US$) 
World Community (of 9) 
Export Import Balance Expott Import Balance 
fas fas fas fas 
1970 42.7 40.1 2.6 11.3 9.2 2.1 
1971 43.6 45.8 -2.2 11.1 10.4 0.7 
1972 49.2 55.9 -6.7 11.9 12.5 -0.6 
1973 70.9 69.8 1.0 16.7 15.6 1 .1 
1974 98.0 100.5 -2.6 22.1 19.0 3.1 • 
1975 107.6 96.6 11.0 22.9 16.6 6.3 
1976 115.1 121.0 -5.9 25.4 17.8 7.6 
1977 121.2 147.7 -26.5 27.1 22.2 4.9 
1978 143.6 172.0 -28.4 32.0 29.0 3.0 
1979 181.6 206.3 -24.7 42.6 33.3 9.3 
1980 220.7 240.8 -20.1 53.7 36.0 17.7 
Source: Twenty-Fifth Annual Report of the President of the United States 
on the Trade Agreements Programme 1980-1981, Washington 1982, p. 127 
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US foreign trade with the Community (in ,000 m US$, f.o.b.) 
Primary products Semi-finished and finished goods 
Export Import Balance Export Import Balance 
1973 6.23 2.18 4.05 10.06 12.96 -2.98 
1974 8.10 3.00 5.10 13.22 15.68 -2.46 
1975 8.32 2.12 6.20 13.63 13.99 -0.36 
1976 9.87 2.86 7.01 14.68 14.58 0.10 
1977 9.80 3.89 5.91 15.59 17.90 -2.31 
1978 10.77 5.08 5.69 20.09 23.59 -3.50 
1979 13.85 6.92 6.93 25.78 27.98 -2.20 
1980 18.11 6.91 11.20 33.30 30.02 3.28 
1981 16.37 11.00 5.37 32.04 31.36 0.68 
Source: GATT, International Trade 1977/78, 1978/79, 1981/82, Geneva 1978, 
1979 and 1982, Appendix, Tables A and B 
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US agricultural trade with the Community 1973-1980 (in million US$) 
Total Feed cereals Soya beans Wheat 
Export Import Balance Export Import Balance Export Import Balance Export Import Balance 
1973 4,526.0 1,119.1 3,406.9 716 11 705 1,209 - 1,209 214 (1) 214 
1974 5,504.2 1,202.1 4,302.1 739 9 730 1,629 
- 1,629 242 (1) 242 
1975 5,564.4 1 ,081. 1 4,483.3 608 11 597 1,326 - 1,326 444 (1) 444 
1976 6,422.4 1,227.8 5,194.6 791 10 781 1,548 - 1,548 298 (1) 298 
1977 6,626.0 1,376.7 5,249.3 889 11 878 2,039 - 2,039 137 - 137 
1978 7,176.4 1,897.6 5,278.3 975 13 962 2,302 (1) 2,302 265 - 265 
1979 7,665.7 1,884.8 5,780.9 1,204 14 1,190 2,258 - 2,258 308 
- 308 
1980 8,928.9 2,079.0 6,849.9 1,697 14 1,683 2,596 
- 2,596 284 - 284 
- = 0 
<1> = less than US$ 500,000 
Source: Twenty-Fifth Annual Report of the President of the United States on the Trade Agreements Programme 1980-1981, 
Washington 1982, p. 130 et seq. 
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Table F 
us trade with the Community in selected products 1971-1980 <in •illion US$> 
. 
Steel products 
Export Inp:>rt Da.lnnce 
95 1,107 
114 1,129 
143 1,122 
217 1,960 
169 1,311 
188 885 
136 1,739 
157 1,228 
207 1,967 
393 1,591 
Road vehicles and 
accessories 
-1.012 
-1 .. 015 
-
979 
-1 .. 743 
-1,142 
-
697 
-1,603 
-1,.071 
-1,760 
-1,198 
Export Import- Ba lane" 
138 1,840 -1,702 
111 1,990 -1,879 
207 2,510 -2,303 
248 2,970 -2,722 
296 2,581 -2,285 
341 2,627 -2,286 
408 3,087 -2,679 
556 4,183 -3,627 
786 4,840 -4,054 
665 5,117 -4,452 
I 
Chemical products 
(excluding plastic> 
Textiles and clothing 
·Irrport Bl!lilflCe ·Export Irrport B~l•:-.ce 
928 524 
991 701 
1,288 889 
1,835 1,535 
1,944 1,374 
2,458 1, 776 
2,485 1,980 
3,041 2,507 
3.901 2,617 
4,313 2,761 
Co!Jiputers and 
related equipment 
Export 
. 591 28 
641 34 
811 38 
1,039 57 
1,030 60 
1 '197 77 
1,548 101 
2,093 125 
1,753 189 
2,378 179 
404 
290 
399 
300 
570 
682 
SOS 
534 
1.284 
1.552 
Blllnnce 
563 
607 
773 
982 
970 
1,120 
1,447 
1,968 
1,654 
2,199 
184 672 -488 
234 725 -491 
313 787 -474 
528 652 -124 
538 566 - 28 
659 696 - 37 
672 820 -148 
729 1,039 -310 
1,242 994 248 
• 
1,376 1,003 373 
Aircraft and 
related equipment 
Export IJtqx>rt -Bnf~nce 
991 132 895 
. 
767 156 611 
1,090 259 831 
1,096 211 885 
1,220 291 929 
1,021 241 780 
1,083 382 . 701 
1,757 329 1,428 
2,355 604 1,751 
3,765 1,033 2,732 
Source: Twenty Fifth Annual Report of the President <loc.cit.> p. 133 et seq. 
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Bilateral trade interrelationship between the USA and the EEC 
(1) (2) (3) 
Volume of USA-EC trade Real GNP (USA) Real GNP(EG) <1) : (2) (1) : (3) 
in ,000 mill. US$ in ,000 mi ll.US$ in ,000 mill. US$ 
1960 9.1 506 270 1.79 3.37 
1970 20.5 993 621 2.06 3.30 
1975 39.5 1,549 1,355 2.55 2.91 
1979 75.9 2,414 2,390 3.14 3.17 
1980 89.7 2,626 NA 3.41 
Source: International Economic Report of the President 1977, p. 153; Twenty-Fifth Annual Report of the 
President of the United States on the Trade Agreements Programme 1980-1981, pp. 127 and 153 
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Direct US investment abroad <Net balance in ,000 mill. US$ as of end of year) 
' 0. 
<0 
Ill\ 
oj 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 • 1978 1979 1980 .. 10 
World ·101.3 110.2 124.2 136.4 149.8 168.1 186.9 213e5 Ill L 
European Community 30e9 35.4 39.1 43.2 47.9 55•2 65.7 76.6 
Rest of Europe 7,3 9.3 10.5 11.9 13.0 14.4 16 .. 9 19,1 
Canada 25,5 28.4 31.1 33.9 35.2" 37~3 40.3 44e7 
Japan 2.7 3.3 3.3 3.8 ... , 5.0 6.2 6el 
Developing countries 25.3 28.5 26.2 28.9 34.5 40.5 44.6 52,7 
.-
11"\ 
I 
Geographic distribution of direct US invest•ent abroad as percentage 
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 
European Community 30e5 32,1 31,5 31,7 32,0- 32,8 35,2 35,9 
Rest of Europe 7,2 8,'1 8,5" 8,7 8,7 8,6 9~0 8,9 
Canada 25,2 25,8 25,0 24,9 23.5 22,2 21,6 20,9 
Japan 2,7 3,0 2.7 2,8 2,7 3,0 3,3 3,0 
Developing countries . 25,0 25,9 21,1 21.2 23,0 24,1 23,9 24,7 
Source: US-Handelsministerium: Survey of Current Business, quoted fro~ Commission of the European Communities, 
Europa information 57/82, p. 25 
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ANNEX I 
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION (DOCUMENT 1-1091/82) 
tabled by Mrs POIRIER, Mr FERNANDEZ, Mr PRANCH£RE, Mr MAFFRE-BAUG£, 
Mrs HOFFMANN, Mrs DE MARCH, Mrs LE ROUX, Mr DAMETTE, Mr PIQUET, Mr FRISCHMANN, 
Mr MARTIN, Mr CHAMBEIRON and Mr BUCCHINI 
pursuant to Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure 
on the approach to be adopted by the Council and the Commission in the 
economic and trade negotiations between the EEC and the United States 
- whereas the legal proceedings instituted in 109 cases by American steel 
manufacturers against European steel manufacturers and approved by the United 
States Government are unjustified, as steel from the Community accounts for only 
1% of the American market, American imports of Community steel having fallen by 
16% between 1979 and 1981, 
- whereas, if these proceedings are successful, this would mean, in particular, a drop 
of over 1 million tonnes per annum in sales of French steel, which could lead 
to job losses and higher unemployment, 
- having regard to the ECSC Consultative Committee's resolution of 5 February 
1982 which states that the present situation represents a violation by the 
United States of the consensus reached in November 1977 by all the Member States 
of the OECD and of the substance and procedure of the GATT rules, 
whereas the United States if once again exerting the same pressure as it did 
in 1979 during the final negotiations in the Tokyo Round, within the framework 
of GATT, regarding the existence and operation of the common agricultural policy, 
- whereas these pressures represent a real danger for French farmers in particular~ 
since the aim is to secure the abandonment of agricultural mechanisms which 
guarantee farmers a reasonable income and to open up the European markets to 
competition, notably from American products, 
-whereas American economic and monetary policy is designed firstly to keep the 
dollar exchange rate and interest rates at a high level, which makes it more 
difficult to implement a policy of economic recovery and job-creating invest-
ment, and secondly to transfer the burden of the American Government's economic 
difficulties to the Community, 
having regard to the Ten's deficit in trade with the United States (128 thousand 
million francs in 1980) and France's trade deficit with the latter (16.8 thousand 
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million francs in 1980>, 
- Considers it unacceptable that the United States should adopt an aggressive 
attitude which is so greatly at variance with the principles of cooperation 
and openness they advocate; 
- Calls on the Council and the Commission to take a very firm stand towards the 
United States, particularly in the forthcoming ministerial negotiations 
within the framework of GATT in November 1982; 
- Calls on the Council and the Commission to make employment and job-creating 
investment the main considerations when adopting its position in the forth-
coming economic and trade negotiations; 
- Calls on the Commission to put forward as soon as possible proposals for the 
concerted reduction of interest rates in the Community which will be acceptable 
to all the Member States; 
- Urges that monetary questions and, in particular, the role of the dollar 
should be discussed in the forthcoming multilateral trade negotiations, as 
allowed for in the GATT agreements; 
- Considers it essential that, if the negotiations fail or there is no 
satisfactory agreement, the Council and the Commission should take the 
necessary retaliatory measures. 
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MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION (DOCUMENT 1-732/82) 
tabled by Mr de la MALENE, Mr COUSTE and Mr MOUCHEL, 
on behalf of the Group of European Progressive Democrats 
with request for an early vote 
pursuant to Rule 42(5) of the Rules of Procedure 
winding up the debate on the oral question (Doe. 1-617/82) 
on EEC-USA relations 
ANNEX II 
A. concerned at the increasing number of trade disputes between the Community 
and the USA, in particular over steel, the gas pipeline, agricultural products 
and preferential agreements, 
1. Stresses the need to strengthen Western solidarity during this period of 
economic crisis, 
2. Expresses its sincere desire that the present trade disputes should be 
settled as quickly as possible and on an amicable basis, 
3. Considers that at a time when Europeans are making a great effort to participate 
in the defence of Western security, a policy causing a deterioration in the 
economic and social situation of the Community would be contradictory, 
4. Considers it necessary for the United States and Europe to agree on policy 
statements towards the Soviet Union and for the commercial sacrifices involved 
to be shared equally, as regards both industrial and agricultural products, 
5. Approves therefore the objectives and methods aimed at reviewing the economic 
policy of the West towards the Soviet Union at a time when events are continuing 
to occur in Afghanistan and Poland, 
6. On the matter of steel, notes the trade arrangements between the Commission and 
the US Government and welcomes the fact that, despite the major sacrifices 
involved for them, all of Europe's steel producers are willing to implement the 
agreed arrangement, 
7. Urges that this arrangement should enter into force as quickly as possible in 
the interests of the relationship of trust which it is essential to maintain 
between the United States and Europe, and therefore requests the government to 
implement every possible means to this end, 
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8. Expresses the desire that the Commission should explain clearly to the US 
Administration the justified natur~, success and importance for Europe of the 
CAP and that the American complaints concerning flour, poultry, sugar and 
food products are not economically justified, particularly in the light of 
the large agricultural trade deficit of the Community in respect of the 
United States, 
9. Recommends that before the forthcoming Ministerial Conference in November 
all the conciliation and consultation procedures under GATT should be 
effectively applied and that this Conference should attempt to achieve a 
better balance in the mutual obligations of the principal trading partners; 
10. Calls for better cooperation between the dollar and the currencies in the 
EMS, by means of appropriate 'interventions' with a view to eliminating or 
reducing the strains and the disorders among them and achieving monetary 
stability, which is necessary for the establishment of a new international 
monetary order; 
11. Finally, supports any move which the Community might make to prevent traditional 
flows of trade between the EEC and the United States from being seriously 
disturbed and the employment of thousands of workers from being jeopardized, 
12. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and 
Commission. 
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ANNEX II I 
MOTION FOR A RESOLTUION (DOCUMENT 1-720/83) 
tabled by Mrs DUPORT, Mr J. MOREAU, Mr BOMBARD, Mr EYRAUD, Mr THAREAU, 
Mrs VAYSSADE and Mrs VAN HEMELDONCK 
pursuant to Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure 
on American wine production 
The European Parliament, 
A- whereas both the quantity and quality of American wine production has 
shown an upward trend for a number of years, 
8 - whereas accordingly, the United States is seeking to export more wine 
to Europe - in 1981/82 the United States imported 4,020,975 hl from 
the EEC and exported 75,303 hl, 
C - whereas the United States authorizes the use of certain products and 
practices on their territory which are prohibited in the countries of 
the Community, 
D - whereas on 26 July 1983, consultation~ between the United States and the 
Commission culminated in an exchange of letters with the endorsement of 
the Member States, 
E - whereas the Commission is planning to make some exceptions to Community 
regulations so as to allow the import of certair American wines which 
have been subject to practices prohibited in the Community, 
1. Considers that these exceptions in favour of the United States are 
unacceptable, particularly as the United States is uncooperative with 
regard to the products that they import; 
2. Calls on the Commission to revoke these exceptions and requests it to 
impose the same obligations on the United States as are required of 
European winegrowers; 
3. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Commission, 
the Council and the Member States. 
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ANNEX IV 
Qf!~!Q~ 
<Rule 101 of the Rules of Procedure> 
of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs 
Draftsman: Mr WELSH 
On 24 November 1982 the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs appointed 
Mr Welsh as draftsman of the opinion 
The committee considered the draft opinion at its meeting of 28-29 April and 
June 14-16, 1983 and adopted it on the latter date on a unanimous vote with 
1 abstention. 
The following took part in the vote: 
Mr J. MOREAU, (Chairman; Mr HOPPER (Vice-Chairman>; Mr DELEAU (Vice-Chairman>; 
Mr WELSH (Draftsman>; Mr BEAZLEY; Mr BONACCINI; Mrs DESOUCHES; Miss FORSTER; 
Mr HALLlGAN (Deputizing for Mr Caborn>; Mr HEINEMANN; Mr LEONARDI; Mr MULLER-
HERMAN; Mr PAPANTONIOU; Mr ROGALLA (deputizing for Mr Ruffolo); Mr SCHINZEL; 
Mr von WOGAU 
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1. The following paragraph illustrates the degree of economic interdependence 
between the Community and the USA, our second largest trading partners 
after the EFTA countries. 
EEC Total Imports inc. intra Community 
Total from USA 
% 
EEC Total Exports inc. intra Community 
Total to USA 
% 
515,931 
43,970 
8 
475,054 
31,530 
6 
Although the deficit, 30% of total trade in 1980, was uncomfortably high, 
the output represented by 6% of total exports is extremely important at a 
time of high unemployment, particularly as there is no obvious substitute 
for the American market. 
This point is even more clearly illustrated when one examines the share of 
US trade by Member States: 
US Imports/Exports % total 
!!!!e2r:! ~1m2r:1 
BLEU 7.7 3.3 
Denmark 4.4 4.7 
France 8.0 10.6 
Germany 7.2 6.1 
Ireland 7.8 5.3 
Italy 7.0 5.3 
Netherlands 8.8 2.5 
U.K. 13.4 9.4 
It is remarkable to notice the extent to which France depen~s on US trade 
and her great success in penetrating the domestic American market. 
PE 84.569/fin.S/ t\nn. I V 
Of even greater significance is the extent of American investment in 
the Community. 
At a time when the President of the Commission reminds us constantly 
that increased investment is the key to the revival of European industry 
the United States is a pre-eminent and irreplaceable source of capital. 
Unfortunately comparable figures for European Investment in the United 
States are not available, but in 1980 the total was $38,750 million, over 
two thirds of all foreign investment in the USA. This spreads European 
portfolio investment and helps to keep the US market open, and provides 
a contra flow of funds to offset profits repatriated to the United States. 
The Level of mutual investment is not only an important source of expanded 
output on both sides of the Atlantic but also underpins the political 
interdependence of the Allies. 
Finally at a time when the problems of rising unemployment are regarded 
as the principal concern of Europeans throughout the Community it is 
important to note the number of European jobs which are supported by 
American companies. 
US Multinational Company Employment in the EEC 1977 <,000 employees> 
X ~ 
All industries Total Manufacturing Total 
Employed Employed 
BLEU 164.5 4.3 124.9 8.5 
Denmark 20.3 0.8 9.2 1.3 
France 470.9 2.2 360.7 4.6 
Germany 587.4 2.4 482.2 4.3 
Ireland 27.6 2.6 22 6.6 
Italy 212.8 1.1 168 2.2 
Netherlands 136.1 2.9 96.9 6.4 
UK 1069.3 4.4 810.4 8.3 
Total 2688.9 2.6 2074.3 5.1 
No figures are available for the large numbers of Community citizens who 
Live and work in the united States and it is impossible to quantify the 
-59, - PE 84.569/fin.B/Ann. IV 
benefits to both sides from the exchange of management and operating 
techniques, patents, inventions and so on. 
The central point is that in economic terms the Community and the United 
States are interdependent and it is of prime importance to ensure that 
the relationship works well and to the benefit of all. No temporary 
disputes on individual sectors should be permitted to interfere with the 
smooth running of the whole. 
2. The disputes which bedevil US/EEC relations have their immediate roots in 
- the recession and consequent lack of growth on both sides of the Atlantic. 
Neither the EEC nor the USA have coped particularly well with the oil shocks 
and the technological revolution. Unemployment in the United States is 
broadly comparable with that in Europe and as in Europe this has given rise 
to protectionist tendencies particularly among the Labour Unions. In an 
AFL/CIO pamphlet called 'Fair Trade not Free Trade' the American Unions 
claim that the US Government has failed to protect its domestic market and 
has been outmanoeuvred by crafty foreigners who have used unfair means to 
deprive Americans of jobs. They have called, among other things, for much 
tighter controls on imports, an aggressive 'Buy American' policy for the 
US Government and restrictions on the outflow of capital for investment 
abroad. More recently the Congress actually passed a Domestic Content Bill 
which would have effectively eliminated foreign manufactured goods from the 
US market unless 60% or more of the components were American made. When 
one considers the implications for European output, investment and jobs 
as shown in paragraph 2, it becomes clear that implementation of such 
policies would be a catastrophe for the Community. Those in Europe who call 
for similar nostrums, supposedly to protect European jobs should reflect on 
the consequences of their policies being applied by the United States to us. 
The steel dispute was the result of myopia by both sides. With the. US 
Steel Industry operating at less than half capacity and jobs being lost at 
an increasing rate the pressure on the American authorities 'to do something' 
was overwhelming; we have been having exactly the same demands to exclude 
imports which are 'costing European jobs' from representatives of our own 
steel industry. The US market represented one of the few export outlets for 
the embattled European steel industry and it was no wonder that every effort 
was made to exploit it, thus leading directly to the anti-dumping suites. The 
fact that so ugly a dispute was solved at least on a temporary basis, reflects 
much credit on the authorities for both sides. 
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A similar but more dangerous situation has arisen in the agricultural 
sector. Behind the rhetoric lies the fact that there is substantial 
overproduction in both Europe and America and in both cases the farming 
community has seen its living standards eroded and its expectations 
reduced. As things stand the United States and the Community face the 
real prospect of an agricultural price war because neither is prepared to 
recognize that the problem is a shared one and must be solved by mutual 
agreement, and that the alternative would be completely destruc~:ve. No one 
in Europe should underestimate the determination of the US Administration 
to defend what it sees as its legitimate interests; as Secretary of State 
Schulz put it at a recent Congressional hearing. 
'The wheat flour sale ••• was on the one hand designed, of course, 
to sell some of our product1 but also to say to people we're 
serious about this problem and we think the negotiations to resolve 
these problems had better be taken seriously by everybody.' 
The European Community would do well to pay heed to this warning. Both 
parties must recognize that mutual concessions and some sacrifice of 
entrenched positions is going to be necessary if a disastrous trade war 
is to be avoided. The same good sense and clarity of thinking that 
defused the steel dispute is urgently needed in agriculture. 
3. Unlike the other cases the pipeline dispute was essentially a political 
issue based on the failure to agree on a common approach to trade with 
Eastern countries and its strategic implications. In particular, failure 
to agree on a common credit policy at the Versailles Summit in June 1982 
led to a crude attempt by the US Administration to impose their views on 
the Europeans. This dispute has also been settled, but its reverberations 
will no doubt continue for some time to come particularly as regards the 
extra-territorial application of domestic legislation. Talks are going on 
with a view to reaching a consensus on credits for the USSR and European 
companies are continuing to supply the Urengoi pipeline. The fact that 
the dispute has been resolved is a tribute to the basic strength of the 
relationship, but it is not a strength that should lightly be taken for 
granted. 
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4. 
The lesson that emerges from this and other di'sputes is that the US-European 
dialogue is in urgent need of refurbishing. There has been an increasing 
tendency to politicise our disagreements so that compromise is seen as a 
sign of weakness and nothing less than complete surrender by the other 
side is acceptable. We need to reach a position where the regularity 
and the depth of routine contacts between the Commission and the US 
administration are comparable with those that take place within the 
framework of the Franco German Treaty. Such issues as the extension of 
GATT rules to agriculture and services, the definition of subsidies, the 
joint management of agricultural markets, agreement on a common credit 
policy, need to be solved at an administrative Level before they can 
become pQLitical issues; then the basic foundations will exist for con-
structive initiatives in the field of international financial management 
and North/South relations. When the European Parliament's delegation 
visited the US Last June a senior State Department official observed that 
the current crop of disputes were basically technical and thus capable 
of solution. However, if the structure of the European/American dialogue 
were allowed to deteriorate in a welter of recrimination and petty 
bickering it was difficult to see how we would be able to arrive at common 
responses to the global economic and political questions that would have 
to be faced towards the end of the decade. 
The Carter Administration Left office with the SUS seriously undervalued, 
a phenomenon which had enabled US exporters to make substantial inroads 
into European markets, notably in the chemical and textile sectors. The 
present Administration has pursued a policy of tight money and high interest 
rates in an endeavour to cover their escalating budget deficit produced 
by higher defence spending. The SUS has strengthened at the expense 
of European currencies, but the high interest rates have attracted foot-
Loose funds and forced the Community banks to raise their interest rates 
in response. The result of the increased cost of borrowing has been to 
discourage investment and delay recovery in Europe as well as imposing a 
heavy burden on those developing countries with huge debt servicing costs. 
Moreover the Laissez faire attitude of the Administration to exchange rates 
has had a destabilizing effect on the world's monetary system, discouraged 
investment and put a substantial strain on the weaker currencies. Unfortun-
ately no understanding was reached at the Versailles summit of June 1982 
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and it was widely felt that the doctrinaire attitude of US officials 
had prevented them from understanding the European case for greater 
flexibility and pragmatism in their economic management. Since then there 
have been some marked indications of improvement in American economic 
performance and it is hoped that this will set the scene for a new 
understanding to emerge at the Williamsburg summit. If there is to be 
any chance cf substained recovery the United States and Japan must join 
with the Community in agreeing to a common approach to exchange rate 
management, perhaps through an international parity grid and a common 
policy on interest rates designed to manage them downwards and prevent one 
country from putting pressure on the others by forcing up rates. Such 
an agreement, which should not be institutionalized, would become far 
more feasible if the Member States could demonstrate their cohesion by 
agreeing to move rapidly to the next stage of the development of the EMS. 
5. The principal economic danger facing the world at present is the 
possible collapse of the banking system under the mounting pressure of 
third world debt. In particular the private banking sector has allowed 
itself to become dangerously exposed in lending to countries such as 
Mexico, Brazil, Korea and Taiwan. European Banks have had similar 
problems overextending themselves in lending to Poland, Rumania and other 
East bloc states. Concerted action by the American and European Authorities 
is urgently needed to defuse this potentially dangerous situation, and 
the role of the multilateral financial institutions such as the World 
Bank and the IMF needs to be reconsidered. It is regrettable that the 
present Administration has failed to take the lead in developing the role 
of these bodies and indeed has reduced its subscription to IDA. If more 
developing countries are not going to face the real possibility of default, 
something will have to be done to alleviate their immediate debt burden, 
without however removing the disciplines of prudent financial management. 
In this regard it is interesting to take note of a speech by Mr Donald Regan, 
US Secretary of the Treasury, during a visit to Frankfurt, when he suggested 
that the IMF might be given a new instrument guaranteed by the US, the 
Community, Japan and other developed countries. This instrument would 
be used as a last resort cover against default so as to enable the private 
sector banks to undertake re-scheduling operations for countries in 
difficulty without facing loss of confidence by their own investors. 
Although it is unlikely that there will ever be complete identity of view 
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on how to solve the world's financial problems much could be achieved 
if the three dominant free market economies could cooperate more con-
structively than heretofore. 
6. American investment is already an important component of Europe's capital 
base and this must be increased in absolute terms if we are to achieve 
our goal of investment Lead recovery. If this is to happen the climate 
must be improved and American investors made to realize that their capital 
is welcome in Europe. In the positive sense this means redoubled efforts 
to complete the internal market, making progress in the development of 
the EMS and enhancing the role of the ECU, both of which are high on the 
List of the Community's priorities. It goes without saying that further 
development of the EMS would make it much easier to offer a credible 
package for exchange rate discipline and would make the potential scale 
of European operations much greater. 
We should also be aware that much of the social and structural Legislation 
introduced by the Commission is perceived in the United States as a direct 
attack on American companies, a misperception that is encouraged by the 
rhetorical indulgences of some European politicians. No one suggests 
that the development of European Company Law shouLd be subject to the 
approval of American business, but such Legislation should be framed with 
at Least some regard for its effect on the investment climate • 
7. The conclusions of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs are 
as follows: 
<a> The American and European economies are interdependent and this has 
a critical importance for European output investment and jobs. Any 
reduction in the degree of interpenetration would be to the detriment 
of European and American workers. 
(b) The protectionist tendencies on both sides of the Atlantic constitute 
a major threat to the smooth running of the economic relationship 
and has Led to damaging disputes in steel and agriculture. Although 
the United States considers herself to be an open market, average 
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tariffs are considerably higher than around the Community and 
successive Administrations have been ready to use mechanisms such 
as Section 301 of the 1975 Trade Act to protect particular sectors 
when under pressure for imports. The proposal for a Council 
Regulation to strengthen the Common Commercial Policy is a response 
to American policy in this sphere and critics of the Community often 
fail to recognize the high degree of protection that the US has 
insisted on maintaining in past GATT rounds. 
(c) A further cause of tension are differences of political views on 
relations with the East Bloc notably as regards the provision of 
credits. This has already led to a serious confrontation over the 
Urengoi pipeline and could lead to further disputes between the 
Western partners and a lasting consensus is urgently needed. The 
Committee considers that this and other attempts by the United States 
to enforce her domestic legislation outside her sovereign territory 
is quite unacceptable and can only lead to increased friction between 
the partners. 
(d) These technical disputes need to be de-politicised and handled 
through a more frequent and deeper spectrum of official contacts. 
This presupposes a common set of Community positions on these key 
issues which the Commission can present on the basis of absolute 
solidarity. It is noticeable that where the Community has embraced 
a common policy vis-a-vis the United States its views have been accepted. 
Recent examples include the steel and pipeline disputes and the GATT 
Ministerial meeting. 
<e> Persistently high US interest rates owing to the large budget deficits 
and the tight stance of monetary policy have had a destabilizing 
effect on the world's monetary system and this has been exacerbated 
by the Administration's refusal to intervene in the markets in any 
but the most exceptional circumstances. Inaction has deepened the 
recession, delayed recovery and imposed a heavy burden on the weaker 
third world economies. The Committee hopes that the follow-up to 
the Williamsburg summit may usher in an era of improved monetary coopera-
tion between the USA and Europe based on mutual recognition of the 
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need to stabilize the exchanges and to bring interest rates down. 
A tripartite programme including the Japanese to restore economic growth 
is urgently needed. 
(f) Cooperation between Europe and the United States is essential if 
lasting solutions are to be found to the immediate problems of third 
world indebtedness and the wider problems of North/South 
relations and the preservation of open trade. Such cooperation depends 
on a conscious effort being mounted to improve the structures of the 
dialogue between the United States and the Community and a unity of 
views among the Member States. 
In particular the Committee believes that the time has come for a 
new look at the IMFandother multilateral financial institutions, 
and at the possibility of providing the IMF with an additional 
instrument funded by the OECD countries which would be used to 
guarantee the borrowing of those developing countries which are 
threatened with default. In particular the United States must be 
urged to shoulder its responsibilities towards the developing world, 
particularly as there are convincing signs that its domestic 
recovery is gaining strength. 
(g) An increased flow of American investment will be an important 
component in the economic recovery of Europe. This can best be 
encouraged by action to complete the Internal ~arket, consolidate 
and develop the EMS, reinforcement of the role of the ECU and 
making sure that legislative initiatives will generally enhance the 
investment climate • 
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